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## MISSION STATEMENT

Like in its parent journal, the mission of the *Journal of Student Research* is to promote excellence in leadership practice by providing a venue for students and future academics to publish current and significant empirical and conceptual research in the arts; humanities; applied natural, and social sciences; and other areas that tests, extends, or builds leadership theory. Primarily, JSR seeks to provide a platform for academic growth.

# Journal of Student Research

## CONTENTS

Editorial Details ... *inside front cover*  
Mission Statement ... *inside front cover*  
About the Journal ... *inside back cover*  
Editorial  
    *By: Maria D. Suarez ... iii*

## ARTICLES

Public Mental Health Services in Brazil: An Analysis of the Reform, Current System, and Future Challenges  
    *By: Estefania Konarek ... 1*

ISIS's Forbidden Fruit: Challenges and Contradictions of State Building in Wartime  
    *By: Anh T. Tran ... 17*

Examining Latino Success at Community Colleges: Retention and Transfer  
    *By: Amilcar Guzman ... 34*

In Defense of Fanon's Conception of the Struggle to the Death  
    *By: Heather Stewart ...56*

## BOOK REVIEW

*Unspoken Politics – Implicit Attitudes and Political Thinking*  
    *By: Emily D. Bello-Pardo ...73*

# Journal of Student Research

## EDITORIAL

W

elcome to the Second Edition of the *Journal of Student Research* (JSR). It is truly an honor to present to you the second student publication at St. Thomas University as we continue to grow and evolve as a student-led publication. The *Journal of Student Research* welcome submissions from all undergraduate, graduate, Ph.D., and law students in a wide ranging interesting subjects.

Our mission is to offer a platform to promote excellence in leadership and provide academic growth. The JSR also seeks to provide a creative and academic outlet for students to publish current and significant research in their areas of interest.

The *Journal of Student Research* is the offspring of the *Journal of Multidisciplinary Research* (JMR), a publication with international recognition. This great work was possible only with the guidance and support of Dr. Hagai Gringarten, *Editor-in-Chief* of the JMR, who together with journal advisor Dr. Raúl Fernández-Calienes envisioned a student journal to foster academic participation by students.

Each article in this volume was carefully selected to reflect St. Thomas' rich culture, diversity, high quality education, and global entrepreneurship. This issue contains publications highlighting controversial topics as well as a book review discussing political thinking.

Respectfully yours,

Maria D. Suarez

*Editor-in-Chief*



“September”

By: Alexandra Valdes 2016

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*Featured Article*

**Public Mental Health Services in Brazil: An Analysis of the Reform, Current System, and Future Challenges**

**Estefania Konarek**  
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Abstract

Brazil's mental health system has undergone various reforms to serve the population's need for mental health care. It is important to understand the history of mental health services to move forward with substantial policy reforms. Brazil, known for its universal healthcare system, *Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS)*, can offer the capacity to provide universal mental health services to its citizens. This article focuses on the analysis of the current mental health system, and how its historic transformation led to higher population access to mental health treatment and services. The research will analyze the development of the public health mental system and will understand the impact of the overall psychiatric reform in the country. Furthermore, the article will address the most challenging aspect of the system, the lack of human resources willing to provide services to the needed populations. Brazil has excelled in moving from asylum care to community care, but challenges still remain. It is important to understand the current challenges and historical facts, to apply successful implementations that will improve mental health outcomes and indicators in Brazil.

**Introduction**

**B**razil, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of \$11,420, is considered to be one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the South American continent (World Bank, 2012). Consisting of nearly 199 million inhabitants, Brazil exhibits a diverse and contrasting demographic profile as well as social indicators. The World Bank classifies Brazil as an upper-middle country, yet in 2009 the percentage of people living under the national poverty line was 21.4% (World Bank, 2012). The main language spoken is Portuguese and 85% of the population lives in urbanized areas (UNICEF, 2011). Over the past decades, Brazil has seen significant improvement in their health indicators. In 1990, for instance, Brazil showed an Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) of 49 per 1,000 live births; twenty years later in 2012, the country recorded an IMR of 13 per 1,000 live births, falling behind Uruguay, Argentina and Chile (World Bank, 2012). Additionally, a decline in incidence of some communicable diseases such as malaria has been observed over the years (Oliveira-

Ferreira, 2010). The average life expectancy at birth is 73 years and 8.9% of Brazil's GDP is allocated to health expenditures, in which 45.7% is attributed to public health costs (World Bank, 2012). The country has the highest health expenditure per capita in the Latin American region consisting of US\$1,120 (World Bank, 2012). Brazil operates under a universal healthcare system that guarantees free healthcare services to all citizens.

The country's *Sistema Único de Saúde* (SUS), or Unified Health System, was created in 1988 by the introduction of a new Constitution that guaranteed "health as a right for all and an obligation of the State." The implementation of the system helped millions of Brazilians obtain healthcare services. Although a relatively young system, 80% of the population depends exclusively on the services provided by the SUS (Ministeria da Saúde, 2010). The three main principles of the SUS are universal access to healthcare, integrality, and equity for all citizens (Paim, 2009). SUS is a single, public health system that combines all health services that are provided at the municipal, state and federal levels of government, directed and monitored by the Ministry of Health, while also including the private sector (required to be under contracts) and foundations supported by public funds (Paim, 2009; Mateus et al., 2008). In other words, SUS is responsible for the administration and management of all health care services in Brazil. Further, the system emphasizes primary level care and focuses on health promotion and public health prevention programs. Under SUS, individuals needing complex medical procedures must undergo a referral mechanism to be seen by a specialist or attend a hospital (Mateus et al., 2008). SUS is a decentralized system—mostly because service provision comes from municipalities and states—that incorporates a holistic approach to care and encourages community involvement and social participation (Paim, 2009).

When it comes to mental health indicators, in 2008, Brazil had a suicide rate of 7.3 per 100,000 people for males and 1.9 per 100,000 people for females (WHO, 2011). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), mental health disorders are estimated to contribute to 20.3% of the global burden of disease in Brazil. Furthermore, Brazil has displayed significant progress in applying policies and legislation regarding mental health delivery services. However, even though Brazil has a remarkable and one of the most successful mental health systems in the region, challenges still remain. As a result, this article will provide an overview of the Brazilian approach towards the provision of mental health care services, mostly focusing in the public sector. Further, the article will describe the development of the public mental healthcare system and will analyze the impacts of the psychiatric reform in Brazil. The article will conclude with a discussion of current and future challenges, and address the human resources aspect of the mental health system. Other countries with similar conditions as Brazil can learn from the mental health system's model presented by this article. The article can help highlight the importance of successful mental health policies and assess the needs for policy-making.

### **Origin and Reforms – Brazil's Path towards an Exceptional Mental Health System**

Brazil's first reform in mental healthcare occurred in 1978. The reform was mostly attributed to the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores em Saúde Mental* (MTSM), or Movement of Mental Health Workers, where health workers, families, mental professionals and individuals with psychiatric history started denouncing violence in asylums, commodity with madness, dominance of private network for mental assistance, and

collectively critiqued the current system (Ministério da Saúde, 2005). Until the 1970s-1980s, mental hospitals and asylums formed the majority of care facilities that treated patients; the environment and quality of services was poor and patients were not given and did not receive adequate care (Jacob et al., 2007). MTSM adapted the emblem “for a society without asylums” in 1987, and brought together a community of psychiatrists from across the country to Rio de Janeiro for the first National Conference of Mental Health in Brazil (Furlanetti et al., 2008). In 1989, by the efforts of Paulo Delgado, the Law 3.657/89 was passed. The law strictly eliminated the usage of asylums as mental health facilities (Lima Martins et al., 2011). During this time, the first *Centro de Atenção Psicossocial* (CAPS), or Psychosocial Community Center, opened in São Paulo—CAPS are specialized mental health entities that provide outpatient care or partial hospital care as day or night treatment (Ministério da Saúde, 2005; Jacob et al., 2007) Furthermore, the first *Núcleo de Atenção Psicossocial* (NAPS), or Psychosocial Care Center, was opened for mental health patients who finished inpatient treatment in the hospitals and asylums. NAPS are 24-hour facilities that offer inpatient services and provide bed services (Furlanetti et al., 2008).


The Brazilian mental health policy continued experiencing modifications after the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the WHO provided policy recommendations in the Caracas Declaration held in Caracas, Venezuela in 1990. The Caracas Declaration was very influential to individuals who suffered from mental health illness in Latin America, particularly because countries began adapting a community-based mental health model while abandoning hospital psychiatric care (Caldas de Almeida & Horvitz-Lennon, 2010). It is important to note the main points settled by stakeholders and policy makers in the Caracas Declaration, which include: a) transforming the old fashioned hospital based mental health delivery systems into comprehensive community systems (Minoletti, Galea, & Susse, 2012); b) making primary care the main delivery method for mental health patients (Minoletti, Galea, & Susse, 2012); c) implementing laws that protect patients who were currently receiving treatment in hospitals/asylums (Mateus et al. 2008); d) guaranteeing civil rights to people who had mental disorders (Mateus et al. 2008); and e) integrating social and healthcare networks that provides access, efficacy and efficiency to people with mental health disorders (Jacob et al., 2007; Minoletti, Galea, & Susser, 2012). According to Minoletti and researchers, “the Declaration set forth the principles that served as the conceptual framework for the reform movement that unfolded in Latin America in the ensuing years.” Further, the proposals from the Caracas Declaration suited the current restorations from the Brazilian Ministry of Health, especially because SUS was beginning as an innovative health system during the timeframe. Also, as previously discussed, some of the basic principles of SUS involved decentralization of services and employing alternative community based programs for the population—parallel to the mental health schemes set forth in Caracas.

After the Caracas Declaration and other movements in the region, the Brazilian healthcare system started gaining definite goals towards revolutionizing the mental system. A Mental Health law was passed in 1992, which proposed substituting psychiatric beds for CAPS openings. Yet the financing for CAPS and NAPS centers was non-existent at the moment. Ninety-three percent of the mental health resources were still given to psychiatric hospitals and the number of beds did not decrease significantly (Mateus et al., 2008; Ministério da Saúde, 2005). It was not until 2001, that Law 10.216 passed and clarified the previous proposals as well as continuing enforcing civil rights for mental health patients. In December 2001, the Third National Conference of Mental Health was held in Brasília, where

the principles and guidelines for mental health services were discussed and established for the Brazilian population. The passing of this law obligated the Ministry of Health to finance mental health delivery for all regions of Brazil, especially with the distribution of funds to increase the number of CAPS across the country (Ministério da Saúde, 2005; WHO, 2007). In addition, under Law 10.216 the *Programa “De Volta para Casa,”* or the “Return Home Program” was introduced, which fortified the process of deinstitutionalization for people kept at psychiatric hospitals by involving family members (Mateus et al., 2008; Lima Martins, 2011). Under the program, financial support was provided to families that welcomed relatives who had been living in mental health hospitals and asylums. This encouraged mental health patients to receive services from the community centers. Both, the passing of the law and the Return Home Program, lead towards the ample progress to improving Brazil’s mental health system.

**Further Progress Observed after more Policy Implementations**

Brazil’s mental health reform serves as a good example on how effective policies can make substantial changes to serve those in need. Extensive governmental procedures as well as commitment from reformers can lead to positive changes. In 2004, the first Brazilian Congress for CAPS was held in São Paulo, which gathered two thousand workers and users of CAPS to discuss the transition from hospital-based psychiatric care to community health centers (Ministério da Saúde, 2005). According to an article published by the Ministry of Health from Brazil, two simultaneous movements occurred during this period: (1) a network was constructed to offer substantive mental care services, replacing the old-fashioned hospital-based care and (2) the controlled progressive reduction of psychiatric beds was seen. Figure 1 gives a visual representation on the decrease of psychiatric beds throughout the years. Between 1995 and 2005, the number of hospital beds fell by approximately 41%.



*Figure 1.* Demonstrates number of psychiatric beds per year in Brazil. Ministério da Saúde, 2005.

Figure 2 demonstrates the significant increase of CAPS in Brazil. Notice the increase between the year 2002 and 2005, which is attributed mostly to the start of financial support from Brazil’s Ministry of Health. Observe how both graphs demonstrate substantial progress after the implementation of mental health policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. With the passing of time, Brazil’s mental health system was achieving a successful transformation.




Figure 2. Significant increase of CAPS in Brazil. Ministério da Saúde, 2005.

### After the Reform

According to Lima Martins and researchers, the previous psychiatric reform brought transformation to Brazilian society and changed perspectives on mental health issues. There was a transition on how individuals with mental disorders were perceived by others. The policies granted civil rights to those with mental disorders, which began decreasing stigma and prejudice. In addition, by opening more community centers, mental health patients were integrated in the community and required to interact with other community members creating mutual acceptance and supportive interactions. Rehabilitation began occurring at homes, leading to the creation of bonds between family members and mental health patients. Furthermore, shelter was granted throughout the country to those individuals who had lost family ties or had no support. These housing facilities served as spaces where patients could develop citizenship skills and receive warmth from others, contributing to their overall improvement in psychosocial rehabilitation and wellbeing (Lima Martins, 2011).

Furthermore, there was a transformation of mental health delivery practices. Construction of networks and decentralization of the system allowed for an increase in “safe space” talks, sociability and exchange of ideas, all aimed toward the patient’s subjectivity, feelings of wellness and acceptability from society (Lima Martins, 2011). The mental health reform in Brazil also brought the medical community to attribute value to the psychological state of an individual, rather than focusing on the treatment or cure of the disease (Ferreira-Furegato et al., 2012). The latter increased provision of wholesome care and brought to attention that psychological and psychiatric states are important to achieve optimal overall health. A study interviewing physicians on the perception of CAPS states that these

professionals understand that curative care involves more than the biological aspects, and that family and society are crucial for good health (Mielke et al., 2009). The results show positive changes in physician's perception towards treating mental health. In terms of financing mental health practices, the reform led for Brazil's Ministry of Health to provide funds and include mental health as one of the branches covered by the universality principle of SUS. Overall, the reform brought much progress for Brazilian citizens who suffered from mental health illnesses. The changes in the system became possible due to the commitment of health professionals and ambitious politicians.

### **Assessment of the Current Public Mental Health System in Brazil**

Brazil has one of the most successful mental health systems in Latin America next to Chile and Panama (Minoletti, Galea, & Susser, 2012). The achievements made by governmental policies as well as shifting from asylums to community-based care practices make it quite remarkable. This section will provide a description and discussion of Brazil's current mental health system, particularly focusing on services provided to the population as well as the human resources and finances. It is important to highlight that although Brazil is internationally recognized for its achievements in mental health provision, flaws and challenges still exist.

#### **(1) Provision of Services, Delivery, and Infrastructure**

Brazil operates under a unique program known as *Programa de Saúde da Família* (PSF), or Family Health Program, which was established in 1994 by the Ministry of Health. PSF aims to integrate preventive and curative actions within 600-1,000 families in defined territories from Brazilian municipalities. These families are served and accounted by the work of health teams each composed of one physician, one nurse, nurse technicians and *Agentes Comunitarios da Saúde*, or Community Health Agents (ACS) (Paim, 2010). ACS's are individuals who reside in the community, are certified to perform health-related work, and usually act as the primary source of contact and communication between communities and primary care physicians. In 2009, there were approximately 30,000 teams in 5,300 municipalities, covering 96.1 million people, which is a little over half of the Brazilian population during that year (Paim, 2010; Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). PSF has managed to provide primary healthcare services to a large portion of the population needing them. The primary care program has led to an improvement in health indicators such as an increase in life expectancy and reduced maternal mortality (Paim, 2010). Further, the majority of primary health centers (PHC) have one physician that provides referrals, yet in the remote regions of Brazil there are non-physician PHC clinics (Mateus et al., 2008).

In terms of mental health, the PSF has made a considerable impact when reaching secluded populations that have never received services. To observe further improvement in mental health provision, it is important for these physicians, nurses and ACS to have adequate knowledge and training to deal with mental health disorders. In addition, links between PHC, CAPS and ACS should be strengthened for better consultations, faster referral systems and shorter waiting time for mental health patients (Mateus et al., 2008). According to the WHO, primary care physicians in Brazil can prescribe psychotherapeutic medicines, yet the majority of physicians have not received training in the mental health field within the past five years to

do so (WHO, 2011). It is important to note that despite reforms, physician should be trained in the mental health scheme. Nurses, nurse technicians, psychologists, social workers and ACS are not allowed to prescribe medication for mental health disorders and therefore must rely in physician's knowledge to prescribe medications.

The following Tables 1 and 2 obtained from the WHO Mental Health Atlas 2011 highlight the current number of facilities, beds provided, mental health hospitals, and overall access to mental health services in Brazil.

Table 1  
*Availability of Mental Health Facilities*

	Total number of facilities/beds	Rate per 100,000 population
Mental health outpatient facilities	860	0.44
Day treatment facilities	1541	0.79
Psychiatric beds in general hospitals	2568	1.31
Community residential facilities	564	0.29
Beds/places in community residential facilities	4512	2.31
Mental hospitals	208	0.11
Beds in mental hospitals	35426	18.13

*Note.* WHO Mental Health Atlas (2011).

Table 2  
*Access to Care*

	Rates per 100,000 population	Females (%)
Persons treated in mental health outpatient facilities	176.03	47%
Persons treated in mental health day treatment facilities	354.85	47%
Admissions to psychiatric beds in general hospitals	30.99	35%
Persons staying in community residential facilities at the end of the year	1.57	47%
Admissions to mental hospitals	88.92	35%

*Note.* WHO Mental Health Atlas (2011).

According to Ferreira-Furegato and researchers (2012), the Brazilian mental health facilities are classified and composed of two main groups:

- (1) Hospital psychiatric services: includes psychiatric hospitals, community based psychiatric inpatient units and residential facilities.
- (2) Extra-hospital care services: includes day services, CAPS (I, II, and III), outpatient care, CAPSad (treats alcohol and drug related problems), CAPSi (infant psychiatry) and Mental Health Services (Ferreira-Furegato et al., 2012).

Based on Tables 1 and 2, it is important to note that Brazil has 208 mental hospitals providing services to the public sector. To make note, these hospitals offer a total of 35,426 beds, or 18.13 beds per 100,000 population. These hospitals admit 88.92 per 100,000 population where 35% of the admitted patients are female, representing a higher rate of male patients seeking healthcare services. There is an additional 2,568 beds in general hospitals that can serve those with private insurance. Notice there's a total of 4,512 beds in 564 community residential facilities, in which 1.57 per 100,000 population stays for an entire year of length. The results from Table 2 show the transition between outpatient community-based mental health services over utilization of inpatient mental health facilities. Nowadays, Brazilians with mental health disorders are likely to seek out services at community-based centers.

In terms of extra-hospital care services, Table 2 shows day treatment facilities treating a large portion of the mental health patient population (354.85 per 100,000 population), for which 47% are females. Outpatient facilities and services treat approximately 176.03 per 100,000 people. The results found in Table 2 reflect that mental health patients are attending both, day facilities and outpatient facilities more often, rather than admission to mental health hospitals. In addition, the number of psychiatric beds is declining, which can be caused by patients seeking treatment and services in outpatient and days facilities such as CAPS.

## **(2) Human Resources**

In Brazil, the Ministry of Education supports nine postgraduate medical programs in psychiatry, mental health, neuropsychiatry and psychobiology (Jacob et al., 2007; Mari Jde, Bressan, & Almada-Filh, 2006). The country has increased in publicizing mental health related research, journal articles and investigations, as well as increase the human capacity in research settings (Bressan, Gerlin, & Mari, 2005). However, deficiency of qualified mental health personnel to provide treatment for patients remains. In fact, the biggest challenge that Brazil's mental health system faces is the lack of qualified psychiatrist and metal specialists that can prescribe medications. The following Table 3 was obtained from WHO Mental Health Atlas 2011 and shows the numbers of mental health professionals and current training for each.

Table 3  
*Workforce and Training*

	Health professionals working in the mental health sector Rate per 100,000	Training of health professionals in educational institutions Rate per 100,000
Psychiatrists	3.07	0.08
Medical doctors, not specialized in psychiatry	0.54	4.97
Nurses	1.60	0.74
Psychologists	9.60	8.44
Social workers	1.02	UN
Occupational therapists	1.84	0.48
Other health workers	UN	NA

*Note.* UN: Data not available, NA: Not Applicable. Source: WHO Mental Health Atlas (2011).

The number of psychiatrists consists of 3.07 per 100,000 population. That is, for every 10,000 people, there are .307 psychiatrists (not even one full qualified psychiatrist for 10,000 people). There are, however, 9.60 per 100,000 psychologists practicing in Brazil. Notice how the number of psychologists triples the number of psychiatrists. Becoming a psychologist in Brazil requires less time and commitment than psychiatry. Furthermore, according to Mateus et al. (2006), the few psychiatrists that are serving in the country are concentrated in the wealthier areas and larger cities, not in the secluded areas of the country. For example, in 2005 the density of psychiatrists in São Paulo was 1.75 times greater than the national average (Mateus et al., 2006). As a result, there is a shortage and an unequal distribution of qualified mental health personnel in geographical areas of the country, leaving millions without access to adequate mental health care and treatment.

### **(3) Finances**

Although highly dependent on taxes, according to the WHO, the expenditures for mental health in Brazil are 2.38% of the total health budget, and mental hospitals expenditure account for 32.29% of the total mental health budget (Mental Health Atlas, 2011). Figure 3 below gives a visual illustration of the allocation of funds for mental health next to other health expenditures in 2001. Based on the above statistic, since 2001-2011, Brazil has managed to keep a stable percentage of expenditure for mental health.




Figure 3. Allocation of health expenditures in 2001. WHO, 2007.

In addition, Figure 4, pictured below, shows the interesting transition from hospital expenditures and extra-hospital expenditures. In 2005, hospital expenditures were higher than extra-hospital services, and in 2006 extra-hospital expenditures overpassed hospital costs. As hospital costs for mental health decreased over the years, extra-hospital expenditures increased over the years. In 2010, approximately 67% of costs were attributed to extra-hospital care and 33% to hospital care (Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). According to Weber and researchers, “the funding component played a crucial role as the inducer of the change of the mental health care model” (Weber Gonçalves et al., 2012).




Figure 4. Demonstrating the hospital expenditures. Dal Poz, et al. (2012).

### The Importance and Role of CAPS

Because large part of the Brazilian mental health system operates under CAPS, the presence of these community centers will be discussed. CAPS are intermediate therapeutic spaces between hospitals and communities (Mateus et al., 2008). These psychosocial centers assist in the social reintegration of individuals who have been affected by mental health disorders. CAPS serve those who have severe mental disorders, are dependent on psychoactive drugs, abuse alcohol and drugs, and children or adolescents with mental health disorders (Ministério da Saúde, 2008; Lima Martin et. al, 2011). CAPS are classified into different levels by the complexity of services offered, amounts of population covered and allocated funds

(Mateus et al., 2008; Mental Health Atlas, 2011). CAPS I are units opened five days a week that serve smaller areas with approximated population of 20,000 to 50,000. CAPS II are built to serve medium sized populations of more than 50,000 inhabitants and CAPS III are the largest units that are opened 24 hours per day and offer 24 hour beds for admission serving areas with over 200,000 inhabitants (Mateus et al., 2008). Based on epidemiological studies CAPS are opened for populations with higher prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse, and are mostly located in wealthier cities of Brazil, such as Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo. Although CAPS numbers have increased in Brazil, the centers are unequally distributed with more locations in the Southeastern areas of the country (Ministério da Saúde, 2005). Unfortunately, CAPS are not established in some secluded towns and villages of the country. The most vulnerable can lack access to such essential mental health centers.

CAPS hold a strategic role in organizing networks for care in the community. CAPS assume this role by conducting programs and mental health programs that develop therapeutic and community projects, dispensing psychotic medications, supporting and directing patients that live in therapeutic residences as well as assisting community health workers that offer home services (Lima Martins et al., 2011). CAPS aims to offer rehabilitation services, care, an increase in interpersonal relationships, and create safe environments for those with mental disorders. Primary physicians are required to refer individuals with mental health disorders to any CAPS depending to availability. CAPS were crucial towards the successes observed by the Brazilian mental health reform. According to Lima Martins and researchers, “The practices of CAPS function as catalysts for building existential territories to accept or re-accept their 'users', making them citizens or 'worlds' in which its users can gain or regain their daily lives” (Lima Martins et al., 2011). These Centers are specifically committed to treating mental health disorders for poorer populations in Brazil.

### **Discussion: Challenges of the Current Public Mental Health System**

The mental health system is serving a large portion of the Brazilian population effectively and efficiently. Nevertheless, the system is facing a variety of challenges. The first challenge to note is the lack of psychiatrist and mental health specialists serving throughout the country. According to Dal Poz and researchers, three challenges in the mental health system exist within Human Resources: (1) lack of specialized professionals to cover the demand of services across the country; (2) adjustment of the medical education system for future physicians to recognize the importance that social determinants of health play on mental health issues; and (3) the education, training and supervising of physicians that are currently working for the health system (Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). These challenges are critical and must be addressed for the success and sustainability of Brazil’s public mental health system. As previously mentioned, other challenges include unequal distribution and coverage of community units and services throughout regions, governmental failure to provide incentives and resources for mental health care, and lack of continuous regulation practices by health officials (Jacob et al., 2007). Much work needs to be done in order for the system to remain sustainable.

The phenomenon of globalization also accounts as a challenge for the Brazilian Public Mental Health system, in particular regarding the delivery of services to the poor (Fregni, 2007). Physicians are being trained under European and United States standards, rather than receiving education tailored to the socio-economic conditions of the Brazilian population. A study showed that lower-income populations in Brazil are suffering at higher rates of

depression than individuals in developed countries like England (Lima-Costa et al., 2012). Treatment practices that are efficient in developed countries can have inverse effects for developing countries, which negatively impact the quality of services for the poor (Fregni, 2007). Further, globalization is causing an increase in health care expenditures, taking away resources dedicated to mental health (Weber Gonçalves et al., 2012). Although Brazil has a good portion of their health budget attributed toward mental health practices, a small decrease in funds has been observed over the years. This decrease can be attributed to the rising prices of innovations, technologies and pharmaceuticals that other sectors in the healthcare system utilize. SUS itself is experiencing difficulty financing healthcare services, mainly because it depends on public funds paid by the wealthier class, which underutilize the system. Another challenge is observed in the generation of research for mental healthcare. Although Brazil has established public foundations that investigate various aspects of mental health more clinical research is necessary (Bressan, Gerlin, & Mari, 2005; Fregni, 2007; Razzouk et al., 2010). Research has been focusing on the perception of interventions, or testing new drugs yet these studies are not beneficial for the poorer populations, and are performed mostly for investigators to receive international scientific merit. Alternative treatments, approaches and implementations at the clinical level must be further investigated in the mental health research field (Fregni, 2007).

Last, another challenge remains which pertains to the increase of mental health disorders observed in children (Fatori, Evans-Lacki, & Bordin, 2012). Research must be targeted to find explanations of such occurrences, although a large portion is attributed to violence and drug abuse within families (Fleitlich & Goodam, 2001). Violence and alcohol abuse is very prevalent in Latin American countries, and Brazil is no exception to this rule (Bordin, Paula, dos Nascimento, & Duarte, 2006; Fleitlich & Goodam, 2001). Violence in secluded areas of the country as well as drug abuse also remain as challenges for the mental healthcare system of the country. There is scarcity of health services for children and adolescents throughout the country (Paula et al., 2012). If these cases were treated earlier, the system would benefit from cost-effectiveness and guarantee quality of life for future generations. Nevertheless, more research must be performed to analyze effective practices to treat these vulnerable populations. More professionals specialized in child psychology as well as violence and drug abuse must be recruited for the public health system to observe successful outcomes in these areas. Mental health disorders are complex and difficult to overcome and if qualified personnel are not available negative consequences are observed for all age groups.

### **Addressing the Human Resources Challenge**

For the purposes of this article, the human resources challenge will be addressed and further discussed. The Human Resource sector of healthcare systems is crucial for proper delivery, equal population coverage and sustainability of the system. Lack of qualified personnel can damage a population's health status. Unlike any other medical procedure, both psychological and psychiatric care requires the presence of adequately trained and qualified personnel. Other health sectors involve technological equipment or sophisticated exams to provide diagnosis and treatment, yet when dealing with mental health disorders, the most important tool for care provision are human beings; it can be said that mental health services are dependent on humans (Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). Mental health requires both inter- and intra-sectorial approaches to observe betterment in patient's lives. As a result, Brazil

needs to ensure that mental health interventions are aimed towards the different sectors of society, such as families, community members, health personnel and physicians (Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012).

Physicians and health care providers must have the right competency and knowledge pertaining mental health disorders. Training programs should be developed and taught to current and future physicians serving in medical facilities. There have been many contradictions regarding suitable approaches in which primary care physicians should treat mental health issues (Onocko-Campos & Pereira Furtado, 2006). Therefore, educational curriculums and guidelines must be developed and research must be conducted in order to clarify the best way to combat mental health at primary care. According to Dal Poz and researchers, reaching these objectives is not an easy task but if there is commitment from the governance sectors as well as stakeholders, successful shifts can be observed (Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). Both, the Ministries of Health and Education must form partnerships to promote mental health education classes specifically targeted for Brazil's most affected groups.

In recent years, there has been an increase in mental health related-job openings. But as studies demonstrate, there is a huge deficiency in psychiatric personnel (Mateus et al., 2008; Mental Health Atlas, 2011; Jacob et al., 2007; Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). Recently in 2009, the Ministry of Health and Education introduced a program that would provide scholarships to current medical students to specialize in psychiatry, however, there is insufficient information regarding the number of scholarships that were provided (Dal Poz, Souza Lima, & Perazzi, 2012). The overall recruitment of physicians for SUS is becoming extremely difficult. This can be attributed to the lack of benefits, low quality of life and time-consuming profession that Brazilian students refuse to partake in. As a result, the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of Health and Education, should focus their attention on creating innovative projects that provide incentives to recruit personnel to work for the mental health sector. The entire healthcare system would benefit substantially if an increase in practicing physicians occurs. It requires commitment and great effort from multiple sectors of government to generate such a successful intervention.

### **Conclusions and Remarks**

The mental health reform brought positive changes to the Brazilian population affected by mental and psychiatric disorders. The reform increased accessibility to essential psychotropic medication, community integration in service provision, universal mental healthcare and free access to a network of services (Jacob et al., 2007). As stated in the Caracas Declaration, the suspension and closings of asylums, as well as adapting community-based strategies were effective for the improvement and quality of life of citizens (Bolis, 2012). Brazil is a great example of how policy reforms and implementations can transform the direction of a health system. Nevertheless, demographic changes in the Brazilian population are leading to an increase in demand of mental health services, which will increase the gap between need and availability (WHO, 2007). The government must continue to establish adequate policies to overcome the current and future challenges of the system. Therefore, efforts aimed towards successful mental health implementations must be made. The mental health sector of health is crucial and much attention must be directed to all sectors of society for the continuity of developing successful programs.

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*Featured Article*

**ISIS's Forbidden Fruit:  
Challenges and Contradictions of  
State Building in Wartime**

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Abstract

What does ISIS' state building activities tell us about its future viability as an de facto state? ISIS appears to be managing three tasks central to state building with relative success: monopolizing the use of force, setting up an administrative structure, and establishing legitimacy. While this evidence insinuates ISIS has a viable future, comparing ISIS to the experiences of other rebel state-builders will complicate the picture. If the immediacies of survival in war forces ISIS to take a shortcut to governance by overextending its violent repertoires from war making into the realm of state building, it will struggle to fulfill the third crucial requirement of legitimacy. Monopoly and administration is possible under conditions of extreme violence, but not legitimacy, yet all three are needed for long-term state building. Without legitimacy forming a strong foundation for its Caliphate, ISIS will be easier to defeat in the face of a robust military campaign.

**Introduction**

The self-proclaimed Islamic State (or ISIS) materialized under the radar of the U.S. until 2013, when the group began seizing large swaths of strategically important territory in Iraq and Syria. Analysts have since scrambled to make sense of where ISIS came from, what it is trying to achieve, and where it is going (Stern & Berger 2015; Al-'Ubaydi et al., 2014; Caris & Reynolds, 2014; Lister 2014; Zelin 2015). Among the group's most preeminent goals is to control territory and govern populations on the path toward creating a trans-border Islamic Caliphate, as expressed by its famous slogan, *baqiyya wa tatamaddad*, translated as "remaining and expanding" (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014; Zelin, 2015). After undergoing several name changes reflecting its ever-expanding territorial aspirations, ISIS settled on the nomenclature of "Islamic State," symbolizing a mission accomplished, albeit one limited in scope and geography (Barrett, 2014; Mecham, 2015). But how successfully is ISIS actually managing its state building project? Is the context of ongoing civil war complicating ISIS's state

building imperatives? By answering these questions, can we make predictions about the durability of the Islamic State?

To explore these puzzles, I first discuss how ISIS is managing three tasks central to state building: monopolizing the use of force, setting up an administrative structure, and establishing legitimacy as a ruler. The evidence here suggests that ISIS is responding to these colossal challenges of governance relatively successfully, and that we should expect ISIS's hold on territory to be durable. However, by looking further into the experiences of other rebel state-builders, I substantiate my argument that on a longer time horizon, if ISIS overextends the violent repertoires (terror, in particular) that it uses in war making into the realm of state building, it will not be able to fulfill the third crucial requirement of legitimacy (Cronin, 2006; Connable & Libicki, 2010; Katagiri 2015). Monopoly and administration is possible under conditions of extreme violence, but not legitimacy, yet all three are needed for long-term state building (Gartenstein-Ross & Magen, 2014; Weber, 1978). If the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition can wage a robust military campaign that forces ISIS to prioritize its immediate survival (i.e., short-term war making over long-term state building), ISIS will be tempted to take a bite out of the forbidden fruit—that is, to take the shortcut of governing through terror instead of legitimacy. In so doing, it will further erode future prospects for strengthening legitimacy in the Caliphate, and resting upon shaky foundations, the Caliphate will be easier to topple for the coalition of powers that seeks its demise.

### **The Challenges of Rebel State Building**

In 2014, ISIS formally declared the establishment of the Caliphate, which represented for the group not only statehood but also a demand for the allegiance of Muslims worldwide (Barrett, 2014). Al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations responded with statements that due to ISIS's limited control of territory, the declaration of the Caliphate came too hastily. Islam scholar Usama Hasan added that none of the conditions for a caliphate existed, as implied by its conceptual definition: "...to declare a caliphate for all Muslims when they rule over, at best, a few tens of millions Syrians and Iraqis out of a worldwide Muslim population of 1.2 to 1.5 billion, is to destroy any notion of Muslim representation or unity" (as cited by Lister, 2014, p. 14). Caliphate or not, within the territory it does control, ISIS clearly engages in state building activities that may be sorted into the categories of monopoly, administration, and legitimacy, corresponding to the tasks of rebel governance set forth by Gartenstein-Ross and Magen (2014). These tasks are often overlapping and mutually-enforcing; but in the context of ongoing civil war, monopoly and legitimacy may at times come into tension.

#### **I. Monopolizing the Use of Force**

Many of ISIS's earliest undertakings have been identifiable attempts to increase its coercive capacity to the point of establishing a monopoly on violence and a *modus vivendi* with other actors, which is a foundational step in sustaining control over the territory it wishes to govern (Gartenstein-Ross & Magen, 2014). Arguably, ISIS's most intrusive arm of governance are the well-paid and well-branded local police forces that carry out ISIS's legal rulings. In addition, a "morality" police force (*al-Hisbah*) is tasked with enforcing ISIS's particularly austere interpretation of *shari'a* (Caris and Reynolds, 2014; OHCHR, 2014). Both are deployed out of dozens of headquarters and maintain regular patrols in the Syrian provinces of Aleppo and

Raqqa (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). Beyond surveillance and security, these civil police forces also have more routine responsibilities. *Al-Hisbah* oversees the observance of prayer, the demolition of cultural symbols considered heretical, and records any violations of *shari'a* law. These police forces assume dominance as ISIS forces into surrender all other armed groups operating in its territory, which has been greeted with popular approval in the cases where those neutralized are looters or other local menaces (Khalaf, et al., 2014). Unfortunately, this also means that ISIS's other challengers in civil society, such as political activists, are imprisoned, killed, or forced to flee.

ISIS monopolize the means of violence through an entire coercive infrastructure. There are at least seven detention centers spanning Aleppo's skyline, filled with *shari'a* violators and political dissidents (Lister, 2014). The presence of these facilities perhaps serves to remind the population that political, religious, and civil opposition to ISIS will not be tolerated, especially at such a fragile stage in the making of state when ISIS must authenticate itself as the preeminent authority and sole coercive power. Moreover, since 2013, ISIS has created many new military training camps that also feature political and religious instruction for the purpose of crafting a highly professionalized and ideologically-united standing army (Lister, 2014; Hassan, 2014). These cohesive and well-trained military forces are not only critical for the success of the ongoing insurgency, but also for the fundamental state building imperatives of securing borders from external threats, preserving territorial integrity, and maintaining internal order.

Finally, ISIS conducts protection rackets that reminisce the Tillian states which trade promises of protection from state violence and the violence of other armed actors in exchange for governed people's compliance and loyalty (Tilly, 1985). In defiance of the traditional protections accorded to religious minorities through *dhimmi* status, ISIS generally does not most harm non-Muslims residing in the stronghold of Raqqa and elsewhere as long as they pay taxes twice a year and do not violate restrictions on where they can worship, how they can express their religion, and what they can say about Islam (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). Both Muslim and non-Muslim civilians seem to be adjusting to this situation, finding that living under ISIS's control provides some measure of much-needed stability in comparison to the chaos and randomized violence of a war (Khalaf, 2015). Local tribes have also pledged money, manpower, and weapons to ISIS and, in return, ISIS leaves them alone (Ghambir, 2014). By 2014, this "complex extortion network" supplied ISIS's war chest with \$12 million every month in Mosul alone (Lister, 2014, p. 22). In sum, by monopolizing the use of force, ISIS can extract the resources necessary for state building while simultaneously maximizing control over internal threats.

Through these assertions of dominance, ISIS has demonstrated itself to be a nonstate transmutation of Hobbes' Leviathan, granting itself the full range of powers necessary to fend off invaders and rise above its most formidable internal opponents (Hindess, 2006). But unlike the Leviathan, it exempts itself from consulting its subjects or receiving judgment from them. Thus, the social contract is weak to non-existent. While this governing style is effective for mounting an insurgency and solidifying a monopoly on violence, there are limitations to its continuation in terms of building legitimacy. When ISIS was still known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda central forewarned AQI founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, that the mass killing of Iraqi civilians must end if AQI hoped to garner the public acceptance vital for consolidating a caliphate: "The establishment of a governing authority...does not depend on force alone. Indeed, it's imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance" (as cited by Barrett, 2007, p. 67). At some

point, ISIS must convert its coercive apparatus from servicing rule by terror to servicing rule by consent, if it wants to be considered a legitimate state actor (Gilley 2006).

## II. Administration and Public Goods

The remainder of ISIS's state-like activities belongs in the domain of public governance, particularly through an intricate system of bureaucratic administration and social service provision that began as far back as 2005 (Lister, 2014.) ISIS boasts of running its Department of *Shari'a* through several dozen offices in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces (Caris & Reynolds, 2014.) The *Shari'a* Department encompasses the affairs of *al-Hisbah*, the planning of religious events, and institutes for adult religious education. A separate department for education (*al-ta'lim*) builds new schools and manages children's exclusive study of the Islamic sciences. The court system punishes violators of *shari'a*, but enjoys a degree of popular acceptance because it is considered less corrupt than secular courts, and hears civilian grievances against ISIS fighters and local emirs (Lister, 2014). Non-religious administrative divisions consist of labor and employment, accounting, recruitment, and public affairs. Altogether, these administrative bodies deliver the benefits of public sympathy, sculpt the next generation of Islamic State citizens, and legitimize ISIS's religious authority, often without the use of force.

ISIS's ability to upkeep this elaborate organizational web will be contingent on overcoming the shortages of skilled managers. ISIS has responded to this complication by absorbing many former members of the Ba'athist party into top leadership positions with the suitable bureaucratic know-how (Barrett, 2014). Self-declared Caliph al-Baghdadi pleaded last summer for "scholars, the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields" to immigrate to ISIS-controlled areas, where their talents could be put to use. As an extra incentive, immigrants and foreign fighters are provided housing, monthly food supplies, allowances, and gifts (Hoyle et al., 2015). Foreign fighters detained along bordering states have testified that ISIS even sent lawyers to help them cross the border (Hoyle). There is some evidence that families and individuals have heeded al-Baghdadi's call to live under ISIS's wing, but where the dearth of manpower persists, ISIS will violently coerce skilled workers into servicing its administrative needs (Caris and Reynolds, 2014).

Perhaps ISIS's most decisive role as a state-like entity is to provide social services, which certainly come with no shortage of public affection. Recognizing the economic emaciation of war-torn Iraq and Syria, ISIS routinely repairs and reworks the infrastructure seized to operate more efficiently and equitably (Lister, 2014; Barrett, 2014; Caris & Reynolds, 2014). For example, ISIS transformed two power turbines at Lake Assad that used to work part-time into eight full-time turbines, enabling it to dispense more electricity and drinking water for surrounding communities (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). ISIS subsidizes food prices and increased mass production of bread from the grain silos and industrial bakeries it has captured (Barrett, 2014). ISIS also expects smaller bakeries to contribute to this effort by paying *zakat* (Islam's religious obligation of alms-giving), which lowered the cost of bread in Deir Ezzor in Syria by 75 percent (Lister, 2014). In Mosul, ISIS capped rent prices and erected free hospitals (Lister).

ISIS has been documented providing other services such as public transportation, postal delivery, soup kitchens, loans for construction projects, free health care, vaccinations, and compensation for families of deceased ISIS fighters, which has bolstered much-needed economic activity in areas ravaged by war (Lister, 2014; Barrett, 2014; Caris & Reynolds, 2014). Currency

exchanges have proliferated and local shops are introducing an increasing variety of food products (Khalaf, 2015). A consumer protection bureau operates out of Raqqa city, shutting down businesses that sell shoddy products (Barrett, 2014.) In ISIS-controlled areas of Libya, pharmacies and the health industry must observe strict regulations on consumer protection (Zelin, 2015). As a western immigrant into ISIS-controlled territory observed, “It’s almost like a normal town but the shops all close for *salah* [prayer] and you see mujahideen everywhere” (Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 22). Her words suggest that ISIS has to some degree fulfilled basic state functions.

None of the governance activities mentioned above, nor the continuance of a vigorous armed insurgency, would be possible without massive and reliable streams of revenue. Beyond the taxes extorted from ISIS’s protection rackets, ISIS relies on earnings oil sales on the black market and to state clients. Estimates of the group’s oil income ranges from \$1 million to \$3 million per day (Lister, 2014). Relatively professionalized taxation systems, such as customs checkpoints along Iraqi highways, operate at full force: “Not only does ISIS offer protection from bandits, but its tax collectors also provide traders with paperwork that shows they’ve paid ISIS taxes as well as counterfeit government tax receipts that truckers can show to Iraqi Army checkpoints, which allow them to pass without further payments” (Prothero, 2014). Combined with other moneymaking schemes like kidnapping for ransom, illicit trading, and auctioning off ancient artifacts looted from the greater Mesopotamia, ISIS has maintained financial independence since 2005 (Lister, 2014). Nonetheless, due to the scope and uneven reach of its operations, ISIS has been gone from being “the world’s richest terrorist organization to the world’s poorest state,” (Johnson, 2014), with areas outside of its strongholds still lacking access to sanitation, electricity, jobs, and food (Kenyon, 2014).

### III. Establishing Legitimacy

Much if not all of ISIS’s attempts at monopolizing the means of violence and installing a government have been for the purpose of legitimating itself as the sole authority over the territory it occupies. ISIS has supplemented its governance efforts with a robust informational campaign aimed at justifying its religious ideology, military policies, and governance decisions, or as Khalaf (2015) puts it, to “market the correctness and ultimate solidity and victory of its Islamic State.” ISIS enjoys a virtual monopoly over the media outlets in its jurisdiction, which it capitalizes upon by distributing propagandistic pamphlets and disseminating videos (al-‘Ubaydi et al., 2014; Zelin, 2015). It uses these mediums to depict how U.S. airstrikes have obliterated schools and hospitals rather than military sites, as well as to applaud itself for quickly rebounding its operations in the smoldering aftermath of these attacks. ISIS seems to think by portraying Muslims suffering at the hand of imperialist belligerents, this will discredit Western policy among the Muslim diaspora and inspire foreign fighters to volunteer for ISIS (Hoyle et al., 2015; Kohlmann & Alkhouri, 2014). Thus far, U.S. counter-narratives have failed to match the resonance of ISIS’s accounts among ISIS sympathizers (Briggs & Feve 2013).

Another key ingredient legitimating ISIS’s authority is to procure the cooperation of local Sunni tribes, an endeavor to which ISIS devotes an entire administrative department (Lister, 2014). ISIS seems to be compensating for its weak reach into peripheral areas by implementing a form of indirect rule that borrows from the traditional authority of the tribal system. ISIS entices tribes with economic incentives, promises of political stability, and freedom from roving rebel warlords (Lister). As one tribal leader from Homs province attests, “They offer diesel and fuel.

They bring barley and animal feed from Iraq. They build wells at their own expense for the tribes and they say, ‘Others have neglected your needs’ ” (Lucas, 2014). Sometimes, ISIS will violently intimidate tribes into submission, as can be seen in the large-scale massacres of hundreds of members of the Shueitat tribe in Syria and the Al Bu Nimr tribe in Iraq. At other times, ISIS manipulates tribal divisions as part of a divide-and-rule strategy by pitting Sunni competitors or sub-tribes and clans against one another: “[ISIS] has secretly sought the loyalty of and alliance with influential tribal leaders. With these then came pledges that include sharing financial revenues for the promotion of tribal figures to future influential positions at the expense of existing leaders. Thus, by empowering tribes to govern their own state of affairs in allegiance to it, ISIS seems to be indirectly managing some of them” (Hassan, 2014).

Attempts at tribal outreach have yielded mixed outcomes. ISIS has managed to attract tribesmen to become foreign fighters and secured the backing of some tribes in Raqqa and Deir al-Zour provinces (Lucas, 2014; Al Arabiya News, 2014). On the contrary, the Shammar tribe along the Iraq-Syria border has joined Kurdish militants in opposition to ISIS, a handful of tribes from Deir al-Zour mobilized hundreds of fighters against ISIS, and others allied with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for counterinsurgency (Lucas, 2014; U.S. Department of State, 2014.) Nonetheless, where ISIS has successfully garnered tribal support, the tribes subsequently became a mainstay of their governance program (Barrett, 2014). An additional benefit of allying with the tribes is that movements perceived as indigenous enjoys more legitimacy, and attracts local fighters who are more trusted by residents of the Caliphate and are less vulnerable than their imported counterparts to travel and financial counterterrorism measures (Bakke 2014). There are limited indications that ISIS is becoming more homegrown, notably through its provision of jobs and services: "In the beginning, when [ISIS] came there were many foreigners, from Syria and elsewhere...Then local people from the city, either sympathizers or just those who needed money, joined in, and now it seems most of the fighters are local" (Kenyon, 2014).

After gaining new territory, ISIS quickly inaugurates police forces to join ISIS fighters in mediating conflict, responding to civilian requests, and enforcing *shari'a* law and civil order (Lister, 2014). As a fighter based in Homs testified, “Our average day here is now normally much of the same—manning checkpoints, going on patrol in the area, settling disputes between locals and between tribes, and a lot of meetings with village elders and their chiefs, so we can discuss their concerns and complaints” (Lister, 2014, p. 19). While *shari'a* is harsh and even inhumane from the viewpoint of Western liberal democrats, the “idea of government according to the teachings of the Quran is hugely appealing—at least until it comes up against the reality of The Islamic State” (Barrett, 2014, p. 6). But even within this reality, ISIS has exhibited great adaptability and provincial variation in how it enacts *shari'a* law, suggesting a degree of responsiveness to local needs (Lister, 2014). Nonetheless, this variation could also be artifactual of the depth of ISIS’ control and capacity. Even if ISIS’s interpretation of *shari'a* were rigidly implemented everywhere in the Caliphate, given the long-suffering regional context of weak states and rule based on the whims of warlords, some people welcome the institutionalized *shari'a* order for its predictability; or at least they may become accustomed to these legal norms as ISIS’s incorruptible courts decide on an increasingly diverse number of civil and religious cases (Lister, 2014; Kalyvas, 2006).

Even if ISIS struggles to surmount the three challenges of governance above, it is bound to secure some popular support as long as it remains a better option than the governments that preceded it. It was in the political vacuum post-U.S. occupation of Iraq and the economically destabilizing conditions of civil war in Iraq and Syria that allowed ISIS to emerge and expand as

a marginally more viable alternative to the the Syrian and Iraqi central governments and rebel groups like al-Nusra Front, which is plagued by corruption and incapacity to provide security and social services (Lister, 2014). Those residing under ISIS’s jurisdiction might be more willing to overlook its many faults if ISIS can continue to improve the standard of living and general level of human security, assuming that survival takes precedent for civilians in the highly uncertain conditions of war (Kalyvas 2006). Osama bin Laden’s advice to the Egyptian Islamic movement pertains emphatically to the social project of ISIS: “How long would the public tolerate having to go without? That has nothing to do with whether the...public liked or disliked the Islamic state. A dangerous shortage of food causes death and people do not want to see their children die of hunger” (Combating Terrorism Center, 2012, p. 144).

### **The Future of ISIS**

Thus far, ISIS seems to be performing quite well given the seemingly insurmountable difficulties of state building in an active war zone, where airstrikes are disintegrating critical infrastructure, making normal economic life impossible, and forcing ISIS to prioritize short-term and piecemeal strategies of governance over long-term institutional sustainability (Caris & Reynolds, 2014). However, because the international community refuses to accept the existence of Islamic State, ISIS will continue to fight a war against a coalition led by the strongest military power in the world, and more contradictions will surface between the needs of short-term military survival and the needs of long-term state building. ISIS cannot abandon its military objective to capture and hold territory, nor can it abandon the ambition of statehood central to its *raison d’être*. Can ISIS prevail in both objectives, or only in one at the expense of the other? To investigate this puzzle, I assess the viability of ISIS as both a governing authority and a warring actor by looking at what causes insurgencies to end. I adopt Connable and Libicki’s (2010) four-party typology of how insurgencies end as an analytical framework with which to compare ISIS and other rebel rulers presented by Connable and Libicki as prototypical of each of their types.

#### **I. Insurgent Victory**

One way insurgencies succeed is by overthrowing the central government, or less dramatically by annexing independent territory (Connable & Libicki, 2010). Connable and Libicki consider the Taliban to represent the latter case of insurgent victory, and identify four important conditions for its success. First, insurgencies that are more hierarchical and less dispersed into networks have better statistical odds of winning, although some devolution of authority allows the flexibility and adaptability required for survival, which are conclusions similarly found in Barrett (2014) and Staniland (2014). Accordingly, former Taliban leader Mullah Omar was known for focusing his energies on big-picture decisions, while devolving policy implementation to his advisors and other councils (Connable & Libicki, 2010). The Taliban’s organizational structure reveals clear divisions of labor between the military and political wing, and between central and regional governance bodies, with lower-ranked Taliban leaders permitted to maintain a base of independent power (Elias, 2009).

ISIS similarly exhibits a unitary hierarchical structure and division of labor between the most powerful *Shari’a* Council, which oversees compliance with *shari’a* law and selection of the Caliph, and the *Shura* Council, which issues commands passed down from al-Baghdadi to lower councils (Barrett, 2014.) The lower councils are responsible for every other aspect of ISIS’s

military and governance operations, and carry out their directives with a degree of autonomy with regard to timing and strategy. Such devolution of authority allows ISIS, as of August of 2014, to “operate on many fronts at more or less the same time, both administratively and militarily,” including govern while simultaneously combatting the “Iraqi Army, the Kurdish peshmerga, the Syrian Army, and a tribal revolt” (Barrett, 2014, p. 29).

Second, rather than building from a cult of personality, the Taliban has procedures for replacing captured or deceased leaders to the prevent organizational disintegration that befell groups like the Real Irish Republican Army, Shining Path, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party after the death of popular leaders (Cronin, 2006). In comparison, because ISIS lacked a system of succession and information sharing at the time of al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006, the number of ISIS attacks plummeted (Ligon et al., 2014). Al-Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, was able to improve performance until his capture collapsed activity yet again in 2010. Since al-Baghdadi assumed leadership, ISIS’s has institutionalized a process for succession, but only time will tell whether this will unfold more smoothly than it has in the past.

Third, the Taliban has kept its coffers full with the \$70 million to \$400 million it earns every year from the opium trade (Freeman, 2011). ISIS has even more adeptly constructed a highly diversified network of funding for its projects, including oil sales, auctioning off looted cultural artifacts, extortion, theft, kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, and wheat production (United Nations, 2014.) Although there is no clear evidence that ISIS receives state sponsorship, the group has been gifted millions of dollars from wealthy private donors residing in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (Rogin, 2014; United Nations, 2014). Financial diversification has also reinforced ISIS’s resilience to disturbances or shocks in any one area of income generation. At the same time, it would be impossible for ISIS to carry out its activities in the same scope and scale without a massive and reliable flow of income, which makes it vulnerable to multilateral counter-financing strategies. Unfortunately, counter-financing campaigns that can match the intricacy of ISIS’s income-generating network face tremendous logistical hurdles, including weak state capacity, lack of political will, overreliance on the decentralized private sector, bureaucratic delay, difficulties in coordination, and disharmony with human rights standards (Biersteker et al., 2007).

Last, the Taliban enjoys the sympathy and sometimes voluntary sanctuary of an impoverished and alienated Pashtun and rural Afghan community, to which it has responded by moderating its religious dogma and becoming more discriminate in its use of terror (Connable & Libicki, 2010.) A modicum of popular approval is indispensable for an insurgency’s durability because sympathetic civilians provide a haven where groups have the “relative freedom to plan, organize, train, rest, and conduct operations” (Elden, 2007, p. 52-53). The benefit of a base of operation is therefore “closely correlated with some uncharacteristically dramatic insurgent endings and a number of all-too-characteristic government defeats” (Connable & Libicki, p. 46). More specifically, insurgents with a sanctuary won 23 out of 52 sampled conflicts that have definitively ended, compared to only three out of 22 insurgents that lacked sanctuary. These outcomes point to a solution underlying the paradox of state building during wartime: as long as ISIS minimizes rule by terror and continues to exchange competent governance, security, and social services for some degree of acceptance and legitimacy from population, it will inch toward consolidating the territorial basis of its Caliphate. If ISIS can establish this sturdier foundation of legitimacy, even the continual threat of war can benefit ISIS by prompting it to further expand its tax base in order to strengthen state capacity and military power, with interaction effects in all three directions (Tilly, 1985).

## II. Insurgent Loss

Historically, the majority of insurgencies have been defeated because even the weakest states will often be “stronger, better organized, and more professional” than its strongest nonstate challengers (Connable & Libicki, 2010, p. 14). Also, as insurgencies undergo great gains or great losses in their military campaign, they face the temptation to intensify their use of terror, which increases the likelihood of defeat (Connable & Libicki, 2010). Connable and Libicki argue that this is because excessive and indiscriminate terror tends to create or harden social and geographic cleavages within the population, and undermines popular support among those communities that would be expected to side with the insurgents. However, limited terror tactics can be effective if insurgents articulate justifications for its targets, the wider population minimally accepts the legitimacy of those targets, and government repression takes a greater toll on civilians than insurgent terrorism (Schlichte, 2009; Wood, 2003). In fact, insurgent campaigns that limit terrorism are associated with a probability of success that is twice as high (Connable & Libicki, 2010).

Connable and Libicki (2010) treat the Sri Lankan civil war as an example of a defeated insurgency. The main rebel group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), initially won the support of large numbers of the Sri Lankan Tamil minority and diaspora. However, several factors coalesced to contribute its downfall. First, the global backlash to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks created increasingly favorable conditions for the Sri Lankan government (Ahmed, 2013). The appeal of the LTTE atrophied as terrorist tactics became widely condemned and its supporters among the Tamil diaspora assimilated into their countries of residence. Had the LTTE abandoned terrorism, it might have been allowed to hide among civilians while regrouping for future escalation, and possibly continuing lower-scale operations in the meantime (Ahmed, 2013; Jalal, 2011). Second, the Sinhalese government exploited dissident voices within the Tamil community, eroded the LTTE’s financing base and military capacity, and overtook the pivotal Tamil semiautonomous zone in the Jaffna peninsula in 2007 (Byman et al., 2001; Mockaitis, 2011). Third, the suicide of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in 2009 symbolized the victory of the Sinhalese government over one of the world’s longest lasting insurgencies, but negotiations might have continued past his death if the LTTE had not been so reliant on his cult of personality (Connable & Libicki, 2010).

Likewise, ISIS faces the temptation to overextend methods of terror utilized in warfare into the realm of governance, which stems from an urge to survive and the propulsion to take shortcuts to monopolize violence in a military contest pitting ISIS against approximately 65 countries (Burns, 2016). If ISIS decides to inflict terror upon its civilian subjects as an immediate solution to the crisis of governance, it risks internal implosion before reaching its long-term objective of statehood. Empirically, it is difficult to discern an aggregate trend in ISIS’s use of terror (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). At a micro-level, terror in ISIS-controlled areas has been directed mainly at foreign journalists and aid workers (Al Jazeera, 2014; Reuters, 2014; Daily Star, 2014; AFP in Baghdad, 2014; Holmes, 2014; Jerusalem Post, 2015), ethnic and religious minorities (Holmes, 2014; Al Jazeera, 2015; ) military deserters (Solomon, 2014), prisoners (Human Rights Watch, 2014), and transgressors of ISIS’s cultural norms (BBC, 2014; Nordland, 2015).

### III. Degenerate Insurgency

Most modern insurgencies have a ten-year shelf life, after which they decrescendo toward the 16-year marker (Connable & Libicki, 2010). Over the course of this projection, the central government's chances of defeating the insurgency may increase slightly. In the event that the insurgent group survives the government onslaught but still fails to accomplish its agenda, it may degenerate from an insurgency into primarily a terrorist or criminal organization. Connable and Libicki identifies the Shining Path as the prototypical case. Shining Path envisioned bringing about a Maoist revolution in Peru, but ended up as a drug trafficking organization that occasionally engages in skirmishes with security forces because of three factors: the effective counterinsurgency efforts of the Peruvian government, the targeting of civilians in terror campaigns resulting in loss of popular support, and the enormously difficult undertaking of total social transformation (Mockaitis, 2011).

After the Peruvian government realized that its own terroristic counterinsurgency campaign had not only failed to degrade Shining Path's offensive but increased the latter's popularity, the government refocused its efforts on reforming human rights and capturing Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman (Mockaitis, 2011). Shining Path, on the other hand, chose to escalate bombings and massacres targeting civilians even as it expanded territorial control and military capacity. Consequently, fear and resentment against Shining Path galvanized tens of thousands of the once supportive *campesinos* into forming civil defense committees or joining government militias. However, rather than being completely wiped out, Shining Path continued to operate for a time as a trans-border coca producer and trader because government reverted back to a policy of neglect and failed to address the "root causes" of the insurgency (Connable & Libicki, 2010). ISIS demonstrates some signs of heading down the same terror-fraught path through targeting minorities and prisoners in the mass killings, as elaborated in the previous subsection. If ISIS loses its grip on territory for this reason, yet neither does the Syrian and Iraqi states recover its strength from years of war and contestation, ISIS might degenerate from an insurgency-turned-de facto state into a purely terrorist or criminal organization.

### IV. Government Cooptation/Mixed Outcome

When counterinsurgency fails or results in gridlock, states can attempt to channel the conflict into political negotiations and elections (Mockaitis, 2011). However, government cooptation may be the least plausible outcome for the ISIS insurgency out of the four typologies. The hatred, fear, and deep indignation that the U.S. and its allies have exhibited toward ISIS indicates that they will not recognize ISIS as an actor worthy of a place at the negotiating table. In the unlikely event that the anti-ISIS coalition does invite ISIS into some political process, it is even less likely that ISIS will accept due to its obstinate rejection of the Westphalian state system: "Our goal is to establish an Islamic state that doesn't recognize borders, on the Prophetic methodology" (ISIS spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, as cited by Wood, 2015). For ISIS, recognition by and negotiation with state actors would be "political suicide" and "apostasy" (Wood, 2015). In this way, ISIS differs from other Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Taliban, who have been open to the nation-state paradigm.

In summary, the defeat or degeneration of ISIS seems more likely than a total ISIS victory, while government cooptation looks most improbable of all. These prognoses are grounded in comparisons between ISIS and insurgent movements, and an evaluation of the

overlapping effects of ISIS's state-building activities, civilian reactions, structural variables, and most importantly of all, decisions to escalate (or avoid) terrorism as a shortcut in response to the difficulties of governance during wartime. The very near-term trajectory of ISIS should resemble that of the Taliban, in that it will successfully retain its strongholds of Raqqa, Aleppo, Mosul, Longer-term trajectories may converge with Shining Path's, and to a lesser extent, LTTE's, if ISIS undermines the legitimacy it needs for state and nation building by over-utilizing terror to govern.

### **Policy Implications**

While the U.S. can do little to change the spiritual concerns at the heart of ISIS's ideological framework, it is possible to address the structural conditions that allow ISIS to be successful. ISIS managed to capture and hold territory only in states suffering from weak institutions, weak governance, and weak civic life, situated in a regional context of underdevelopment and violent conflict. Many scholars have called attention to these "root causes": Lister (2014) offered five broad policy goals addressing socio-political failures in ISIS's areas of operation as a way to undercut its long-term viability; Connable and Libicki (2010) concluded that "with a few exceptions, lasting insurgency endings are shaped not by military action but by social, economic, and political change" (p. 154); and Haykel emphasized how addressing the problem of ISIS means addressing problems that most Muslims share in the region: "It has to do with politics. With education, and the lack thereof. With authoritarianism. With foreign intervention. With the curse of oil. I think that even if ISIS were to disappear, the underlying causes that produce ISIS would not disappear. And those would have to be addressed with decades of policy and reforms and changes — not just by the west, but also by Arab societies as well" (as cited by Jenkins, 2015). Even leading U.S. officials have acknowledged that "ISIS is representative of a larger issue...There are deep social, economic, governance, education issues which have in many ways created the environment in which radicalism and extremism can take root and ultimately gain coherence in these groups" (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

Admittedly, these predicaments are far too complex to grant a silver-bullet solution; but we can be sure that even if the anti-ISIS coalition succeeds in eradicating ISIS by pure military might, more ISIS-like-threats will materialize in the future if the structural incubators for violent extremism remain unattended to. Rather than contributing further to the violence by way of more arms, bombs, and troops, the U.S. can instead adopt a longer-term perspective by converting its military resources into financial and logistical support for development projects headed by local community leaders. Some promising infrastructure already exists by way of civil-society groups and networks of Muslim charities. The anti-ISIS coalition should strengthen and expand upon these efforts.

### **Conclusion**

ISIS has survived numerous tribal revolts, battles with state troops and rebel factions, and aerial bombings from world superpowers, all while more or less efficaciously establishing a monopoly over the means of violence, administrative coherence, and legitimate authority over the territory it controls militarily. We can make several tentative conclusions from the resilience demonstrated by ISIS thus far. First, many local communities have reluctantly accepted ISIS's

brutal methods of governance, and may continue to do so if ISIS continues to service basic needs and provide security from the chaos of war more adroitly than the states it replaced. Second, ISIS appears to be overcoming most of the challenges and contradictions of state building in wartime, but this trajectory is unlikely to continue indefinitely if it by the necessity of war it overextends its coercive capacity, rather than shoring up non-coercive institutions of governance. And finally, the presence of entities like ISIS in the world may solidify into a permanent political reality, at least as long as the structural conditions of underdevelopment and political instability endure which favor their emergence and growth.

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#### *Discussion Questions*

1. How do rebel groups build embryonic states?
2. What differences and similarities are shared between ISIS and other rebel state builders?
3. Can we make any predictions about the viability and future trajectory of ISIS based on how it governs?
4. Based on this research, how should the U.S. need to change its military and political approach to ISIS?

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## **Examining Latino Success at Community Colleges: Retention and Transfer**

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### Abstract

Today, there are more Latinos<sup>1</sup> going to college than ever before. The majority of these Hispanic students begin their education at community colleges. While enrollment rates for Latinos have steadily increased since the 1970s, college completion rates have remained stagnant. This article seeks to examine strategies to ensure Latino student success at community colleges. Success is defined as enrollment, persistence and completion at a community college and transfer to a four-year institution. A guiding framework for the article is an analysis of empirical literature through three perspectives: individual factors, institutional factors and environmental factors. The article concludes by providing recommendations for practitioners and policymakers on initiatives to ensure Latino student success at community colleges.

### Introduction

Researchers and scholars have noted the growth of Latinos<sup>2</sup> enrolling in postsecondary education (United States Department of Education, 2014; Pew Hispanic Center, 2012a). During the fall of 2013, 2.9 million Latinos in the United States enrolled in some form of postsecondary education (United States Department of Education, 2014). This is an increase by nearly four times from the 0.7 million Hispanics enrolled in postsecondary education in 1990 (United States Department of Education, 2014). Currently, Latinos comprise the largest minority group on college campuses, more than African-Americans (2.5 million), Asians (1.0 million), and American Indian/Alaskan Natives (0.1 million) (United States Department of Education, 2014; United States Census Bureau, 2013). The majority of Hispanic students attend institutions in the densely Latino populated states of California, Texas and Florida (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011).

This increase in Latinos enrolling in postsecondary education is mirrored by the rapid growth of the Latino population in the United States. Between 1990 and 2014, the Latino population across the country more than doubled (from 22.5 million to 55.4 million. The Latino population currently comprises of nearly 17% of the total population in the United States (Pew Hispanic Center, 2015; United States Census Bureau, 2015). A large portion of the Hispanic population is relatively young as every 30 seconds a Hispanic youth in the United States turns the traditional college age of 18 (Sanchez, 2015). This relatively young and rapidly growing Latino population

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<sup>1</sup> The terms Latinos and Hispanics are used interchangeably throughout this article.

<sup>2</sup> The terms Latino and Hispanic are used interchangeably throughout this article.

is taking a complex path to completing their postsecondary degrees. Most Latinos that enroll in postsecondary education begin at community colleges<sup>3</sup>. These two-year institutions play a pivotal role in expanding access to higher education, especially for lower-income and first-generation college students (Bailey & Morest, 2006). Due to their moderately lower tuition and flexible course schedule, community colleges are widely considered as a critical gateway to higher education for Latino students (Nunez, Sparks & Hernandez, 2011; Melguizo, Kienzl, & Alfonso, 2011). In 2013, 46% of all Hispanics in the United States attended a community college, the highest share of any race or ethnicity (United States Department of Education, 2015). The surge in Latino postsecondary enrollment underscores a larger shift in the landscape of higher education.

Although a majority of Latinos begin their postsecondary education at community colleges, less and less Hispanics are completing their degrees each year. In 2013, only 157,966 Latinos obtained an Associate's degree, and only 9% of Latinos between the ages of 25 and 29 held a bachelor's degree (United States Department of Education, 2014; Pew Hispanic Center, 2014). Some of the lowest college-completion rates are found in the most densely Latino populated states like California, Texas, and Florida (Excelencia in Education, 2014). The data presents a clear picture: the largest and fastest growing group of students in the United States are on a difficult journey to attaining and completing postsecondary degrees. These trends have serious implications for the future of our nation, and provide a rallying point for practitioners, researchers and policymakers.

The purpose of this article is to examine the factors that predict and explain Latino student success at community colleges. Numerous studies have examined the factors that impact student success at four-year institutions. The majority of this research has focused on the impact of academics, student characteristics, institutional environments, family background and student involvement (Tinto, 1975; Tinto, 1993; Astin, 1984; Padilla, 1999; Bean & Eaton, 2001). While a vast amount of literature exists examining student success at four-year institutions, a smaller body of research has examined the key factors to Latino success at two-year institutions. Community colleges are unique institutions that are tasked with multiple roles including: (1) serving as a bridge for students to successfully transition into a four-year institution; (2) providing adult basic education; (3) providing technical training; and (4) providing English as a second language classes (Voorhees, 2001; Bailey & Morest, 2006). With the growth of enrollments in community college and the ever-expanding mission of community colleges, it is important to understand how to best support students as they attend two-year institutions.

This study examines articles authored between 1990 and 2015 from peer-reviewed journals to help understand the factors that impact Latinos' success at two-year public institutions. For the purposes of this article, success is defined as retention and successful transfer to a four-year institution. The article begins by examining the existing literature through two lenses: the factors that impact retention and the factors that impact successful transfer to four-year institutions. Within each section, factors such as institutional, individual, and environmental influence are considered as key drivers of Latino students' success. The article follows by offering a critique of the existing body of research and concludes by discussing implications for influencing practitioners and federal policymakers to develop initiatives to help ensure Latino student success at community colleges.

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<sup>3</sup> The terms community colleges and two-year institutions are used interchangeably throughout this article.

## Factors That Impact Latinos' Retention at Community Colleges

Research on Latinos at community colleges indicates that although many are enrolling, few are completing their Associate degrees. A recent dissertation by Smith (2015) indicates that Latino students face a myriad of unique circumstances that cause them to leave the community college after just one semester. Additional research highlights the disparities in community college retention between Hispanics and African-American and Asian students. Although Latinos are more likely to begin their education at two-year public institutions, they are less likely than their White and Asian counterparts to complete their Associate's degree (Mullin, 2011; Contreras & Contreras, 2015).

In the past decade, a growing body of literature has identified key strategies to help ensure Latinos successfully complete their Associate degrees. These studies focus on the institutional, individual, and environmental factors that play a role in Latino retention at community colleges. The institutional factors include academic and social supports such as student success courses, tutoring and supplemental instruction, learning communities, and robust student and faculty engagement (Crisp & Taggert, 2013; Summers, 2003; Marti, 2008, McClenney, 2007; Price & Tovar, 2014; Crisp & Mina, 2012; Mamiseishvili & Deggs, 2013). The factors on individual characteristics include academic preparation and financial well-being (Cejda & Stick, 2008; Aguinaga & Alberta, 2015; Karp, Hughes & O'Gara, 2010). Lastly, the environmental factors encompass the role of the family and Latinos' development of identity development (Palacios, Wood & Harris, 2015; Clark, 2012; Saenz & Ponjuan, 2009).

### Institutional Factors

**Academic Supports.** Numerous empirical studies have examined the academic supports associated with Latinos' success at community colleges (Bers & Smith, 1991; Feldman, 1993; Center for Community College Student Engagement, 2012). The most commonly cited academic factors that impact Latinos' retention include peer mentoring, participation in a first-year success-course, and tutoring (Feldman, 1993, Crisp & Mina, 2012; Center for Community College Student Engagement, 2012). Khazanov (2011) conducted an analysis of the impact of a peer mentorship program on at-risk Latino students enrolled in remedial math education at one urban community college in New York. The results indicated that at-risk Latino students who participated in peer mentoring experiences were more likely to persist than students that did not participate in the peer mentorship program. Bremer et al. (2013) built on these results and administered a survey to 7,898 students in their first-semester at three community colleges in the Midwest region of the United States. The results demonstrated that tutoring played a significant role on whether Latino students felt capable of pursuing their second semester of college.

**Social Supports.** Numerous studies have focused on the impact of social supports in fostering Latino student success at community colleges. This area of research examines on the impact of faculty and student interactions, and the role of learning communities-or small integrated experiences where students can take the same courses with their peers. The authors identified that faculty-student engagement as one of the strongest predictors of Latino-student persistence-or the ability to continue in school in hopes of obtaining a college education (Hurtado & Carter, 1997). A study conducted by Chang (2005) examined quantitative data gathered from the Transfer and Retention of Urban Community College Students (TRUCCS) survey. The authors found that Latino students who enrolled in community colleges with a high

likelihood of interacting with Faculty, spent much more time engaging with their professors. Additional research has examined Faculty members' perspective on engaging Latino students. Cejda and Hoover (2010) further analyzed the influence on faculty engagement at community colleges by conducting interviews with faculty. Results indicated that a faculty member's knowledge, appreciation and sensitivity to the Latino culture play a significant role in successfully engaging Latino students. In addition, Latino students' unique and collaborative learning styles were also critical to establishing a classroom environment that can engage students and increase their academic success and retention. The authors recommend that faculty at community colleges rely on collaborative teaching practices in order to maximize Latino student success in the classroom (Cejda & Hoover, 2010).

Learning communities are an emerging trend at community colleges (Rudd, Visher, Wathington, Weiss, & Weissman, 2012). Three recent studies have examined the impact of participation in learning communities on Latino retention in community colleges. Barnes and Piland (2011) conducted a quantitative case study at one urban community college in Southern California. The study found that retention for Latino students was positively influenced by participation in a learning community. Sandoval-Lucero, Maes and Chopra (2011) examined the impact of learning communities on the tenacity of Latino students pursuing careers as bilingual educators at a predominately commuter community college in California. Results indicated that students who participated in the educator learning community were more likely to continue their education than their peers who participated in any other type of learning community. A recent study conducted by Gonzalez, Brammer & Sawilowsky (2015) examined how participation in a learning community, high school grade point average ("GPA") and standardized test scores predicted retention at one community college in the Midwest. Results indicated that participation in a culturally responsive and supportive learning community, where students felt a sense of belonging, was a better predictor of persistence than high school GPA and standardized test scores. Learning communities can serve as a good foundation, where Latino students can build a community on campus to help face additional barriers to pursuing and completing their degree.

### **Individual Factors**

**Financial Well-Being.** Numerous studies have examined the impact of finances on Latino students pursuing a postsecondary education (Cejda & Stick, 2008; Fuligni & Witkow, 2004). Two studies provide an in-depth examination of the impact of finances on Latinos pursuing an Associate degree at a community college. Gross et al. (2014) examined the effects of financial aid on Latino Associate degree completion. The authors used quantitative methods to examine the persistence of Latino students enrolled in Indiana's public two-year institutions. Results indicated that Latino students receiving any form of financial aid to attend community college were more likely to continue their education than those who did not receive financial aid. This trend, however, varied by the type of financial assistance. Grants, for example, were negatively related to degree completion among Latino students (Gross, et al., 2014). A community college's financial status also plays a significant role in whether a student is able to succeed in at a community college.

Chacon (2012) studied the impact of California's economic troubles on Hispanics pursuing a degree at one community college in the state. The authors used qualitative methods and a phenomenological approach to examine the experiences of Latinos in California. The study shows that Latino students have a perception that budget cuts could affect them in several ways

including diminishing access to higher education, reduction of support services, and delaying the completion of educational objectives. Additionally, Latino students perceived that state budget cuts were driven by devaluation of public education, and race and class discrimination. The students believed their identity had a negative impact on tangible policies to help support the Latino community (Chacon, 2012). Additional scholars have examined the role of culture and environment in shaping Latino student's experience at community colleges.

### **Cultural Environment**

A number of studies have examined the impact of Latinos' identity in shaping persistence at community colleges. (Aguinaga & Alberta, 2015). Hawley and Harris (2006) examined student characteristics that impact persistence in completing a degree in a community college setting. Quantitative methods, in the form of discriminating factor analysis, utilized data from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) to examine how various Latino identities play a role in persistence at one community college in Maryland. The authors found that among the strongest predictors of Latino students continuing on at community colleges were students identifying as having an African-American or Latino background and also having a high cumulative GPA. Palacios, Wood and Harris (2015) built on this research by examining strategies for Latino male retention at community colleges. The data analyzed was obtained from the Community College Survey of Men administered in eight states in the United States. A quantitative analysis revealed that Latino males were likely to work more hours per week than their female counterparts, thus leaving them less time to engage in key aspects of the community-college experience. Such activities include engaging with faculty and participating in learning communities. This finding supports previous a theory that Latino males face more pressures given the responsibility to contribute or fully support their families financially (Saenz & Ponjuan, 2009).

A recent study from Clark (2012) provides perhaps one of the best insights into understanding the cultural and environmental factors that impact Latino persistence in community colleges. This study is one of the few to use focus groups for studying this topic. The study conducted focus groups with 15 students at a suburban southern California community college. Participants were separated into three subgroups, and they were asked the following four open ended questions: (1) Share your educational journey; (2) Discuss the factors that you feel have positively contributed to your degree attainment today; (3) What obstacles have you overcome in pursuing your degree?; (4) What advice would you give to a new student to get to where you are? (Clark, 2012). A two-step coding process was used to develop initial themes from the literature and a subsequent set of themes from the focus groups. Three key themes emerged from this study: (1) students indicated a sense of belonging fostered by appreciation for a shared struggle and nontraditional characteristics; (2) students were encouraged through supportive relationships with faculty, staff, and peers; and (3) students reported that their self-confidence grew through the sense of belonging, shared struggle, diversity, and supportive relationships. Although these findings are encouraging, the retention of Latino students at two-year institutions is only the first step in their postsecondary success. The ultimate measure of their success lies in progressing and completing a bachelor's degree.

## **Factors that Impact Latinos' Successful Transfer from Two to Four-Year Institutions**

Research indicates that a large number of Latinos who begin their education at community colleges intend to transfer to four-year institutions; however, few do (Gandra, Alvarado, Driscoll & Orfield, 2012). Among a recent cohort of first-time Latino students that began at community colleges and intended to transfer to a four-year institution, only 15% successfully transferred to a 4-year institution within three years of starting college (Horn, 2009). In California, where a majority of Latinos enroll at community colleges, few actually make it to a four-year institution. In 2010, Latinos represented less than 15% of the students in California that transferred from a community college to a four-year institution (Martinez-Wenzl & Marquez, 2012). During the same year, over 60% of White students and 51% of Asian students successfully transferred to a four-year institution (Martinez-Wenzl & Marquez, 2012). A body of literature has examined the factors that impact the successful transfer of Latinos from community colleges to four-year institutions. This area of research focuses on the individual student factors and the larger institutional factors that help or hinder Latino students on the path to postsecondary success.

### **Individual Factors**

**Academic Preparation.** Several studies have examined the impact of Latino students' academic preparation for community college and their successful transfer to a four-year institution. Roska and Calcagno (2008) conducted a multivariate analysis of Florida's unit record data of first-time community college students. The authors developed this research to understand whether academically unprepared students transferred to four-year institutions. Results indicated that only 20% of students that begin at community colleges without adequate academic preparation transferred to a four-year institution (Roska & Calcagno, 2008). Suarez (2003) conducted qualitative interviews with 10 Latino students from two community colleges in California to gain a better understanding of their experiences. The author found that a majority of students felt that they lacked the fundamental skills necessary to succeed at their community college. Furthermore, students believed that their lack of academic preparation would play a large role in whether they would ultimately transfer to a four-year institution. This lack of academic preparation leads Latino students to stumble into college and into developmental education.

**Remedial Coursework.** Many Latino students begin their undergraduate education with a remedial course. The goals of remedial education are to serve as an academic bridge between poor high school performance to college readiness, prepare students for successful transfer to a four-year institution, and to ensure institutions maintain a standard of academic quality and rigor in college courses (Hodra, Jaggars & Karp, 2012; Complete College America, 2012). Although remedial classes provide an entry point into postsecondary education, these classes are often non-credit bearing and do not count toward completion of an Associate or Bachelor's degree. Even as a well-intentioned initiative meant to help prepare Latino students to succeed in the classroom, remedial coursework serves as one of the biggest barriers to Latinos successfully transferring from two-year institutions to four-year institutions. Numerous studies have found that participation in remedial coursework leads Latinos to spend additional time and money in their journey to obtain a postsecondary degree (Bailey, 2009; Crisp & Delgado, 2014; Complete College America, 2014). Due to a lack of academic preparation in high school, however, Latinos

are more likely than their White and Asian peers to begin taking remedial courses when enrolling in community colleges (Pew Hispanic Center, 2015b; Fong, Melguizo, & Prather, 2015). In 2011, nearly 60% of all Latinos began their education at two-year public institutions by taking at least one remedial Mathematics or English course (Complete College America, 2012). During that same year, only 30% of Latinos enrolled in remedial coursework, successfully completed their classes and progressed toward credit-bearing coursework (Complete College America, 2012).

Recent studies have found that successful completion of at least one remedial class is linked to positive outcomes for Latino students including persistence to the second year of college and completion of a bachelor's degree (Calcagno, Crosta, Bailey, & Jenkins, 2007; Calcagno & Long, 2008; Crisp & Nora, 2010). For example, students who successfully complete math remediation are 15% more likely to transfer to a four-year institution than students with similar levels of academic preparation (Bettinger & Long, 2005). In addition, students who successfully complete English remediation are more likely to transfer and complete their postsecondary degrees than those who fail their courses (Bettinger & Long, 2005; Moss & Yeaton, 2006; Bahr, 2010).

### **Institutional Factors**

**Culture of Transfer.** Research indicates that two-year institutions with a “culture of transfer” are successful in helping Latino students transfer to four-year institutions. Developing a culture of transfer at two-year institutions requires community college leaders and staff to understand state and local articulation agreements and provide students with clear and accurate information on the transfer process (Marinick & Swarthout, 2013; Herrera & Jain, 2013; Jain et al., 2011; Cosgrove & McDoniel, 2009). Effective academic advising is a central component to creating an effective culture of transfer (Ortiz, 2003; Tovar, 2015; Budd & Stowers, 2015). Orozco, Alvarez & Gutkin, (2010) conducted in-depth interviews with 363 Latino, African American, Asian, Native American and White students across nine community colleges in California. Overall, three themes emerged regarding how best to advise Latino students: (1) Latino students are less likely to use academic advisors than their White and Asian peers; (2) academic counselors that create comfortable and welcoming environments are successful in connecting with Latino students; and (3) Latino students find it important to be advised by counselors that exhibit an understanding of their cultural background.

**Placement Exams.** Academic placement exams play a large role in Latino students' ability to successfully transfer to four-year institutions. At most community colleges, students are placed in courses based on their scores on standardized placement exams that measure English and Mathematic skills (Hughes & Scott-Clayton, 2011). Many Latino students, however, are unaware of the purpose or the consequences of these placement exams (Grubb et al., 2011; Venezia, Kirst, & Antonio, 2003). This lack of knowledge coupled with language barriers and a lack of academic preparation often lead Latinos to perform poorly on placement tests and as result enroll in non-credit bearing coursework (College of the Canyons, 1994; Bunch & Panayotova, 2008; Deil-Amen & Tavis, 2010). Hodara, Jaggars and Karp (2012) conducted interviews with community college leaders at institutions in Georgia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. Results indicated that innovative community colleges are providing students with increased preparation for placement exams, developing techniques to ensure the accurate placement of students into remedial coursework and aligning

placement exams to the curriculum of four-year institutions in order to ensure the long-term success of their students.

Marwick (2004) examined the impact of alternative institutional placement policies on student academic success. The author randomly assigned 300 Hispanic students at one Hispanic serving institution in Chicago using one of four academic placement methods: (1) placement by just test scores, (2) placement by high school preparation, (3) placement by test scores and years of high school math, and (4) placement by student choice after an analysis of test score and high school preparation. The outcomes of all students were compared by placement method to determine if one or more alternate methods of placing students in courses was significantly associated with greater success. Results indicated that placement methods that rely solely on one technique placed many Latino students into lower-level courses than multiple measure methods. Additional findings underscore the difference in the academic placement of Hispanics students and their peers. Through the high school mathematics placement method, over 80% of Latinos were placed in remedial coursework, while only 50% of White students were placed in remedial coursework. The results of this study present a clear message: academic placement methods can lead to positive academic results for Latino students.

### **Critique of the Literature**

The existing literature on Latino student success at community colleges provides a glimpse into the factors that positively impact retention and transfer to four-year institutions. Although the current literature is an important contribution in advancing the study of Latinos in higher education, there are several limitations. These limitations include the sample that many researchers utilize, the method that many researchers employ and the epistemological approach that the majority of scholars take when studying this topic.

**Sample.** The majority of researchers utilize a sample that is heavily based on Mexican-American students from California. Given that a majority of Latinos in the United States are of Mexican descent and that the community college system in California is the oldest and largest in the country, it is understandable that researchers would focus on this sample (California State Department of Education, 1960; Pew Hispanic Center, 2014). However, contrary to popular belief, Latinos in the United States are not a monolithic group. There are key differences in the experience and education levels of Latinos in the United States (Logan & Turner, 2013).

Researchers should include a diverse sample of Latino students from an array of states in their studies. The most effective research would include some of the largest growing Latino subgroups including Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Salvadorians and Dominicans (Motel & Patten, 2012). In addition, researchers should strive to focus on states with an emerging Latino presence. States in the South such as North Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia and Tennessee should be of particular interest for researchers. These states have an emerging Latino population and are vital to ensuring the long-term educational success of Hispanics (Vasquez, 2010).

**Method.** The majority of researchers employ narrow methods that do not capture the full story of Latinos and their community college experience. Because academic preparation plays such a large role in Latino student's postsecondary success, it is important to take a longitudinal perspective on Latinos' retention at community college and transfer to four-year institutions. Researchers should conduct one study that: (1) analyzes Latinos' academic performance in high school; (2) examines their experience at community colleges; and (3) focuses on the factors that

impact their successful transfer to four-year institutions. This holistic perspective would allow for a comprehensive view of the Latino student success at two-year institutions and beyond.

Although the existing body of research utilizes multiple qualitative methods such as interviews, focus groups and surveys, it lacks a qualitative approach that could provide a deeper understanding of Latinos' experience. Researchers should explore taking a phenomenological approach in order to understand the everyday experience of Latinos at community college and at four-year institutions. Through a quantitative lens, the majority of studies analyze data from either a single or small subset of states. Future research should utilize national databases to help further explore this topic. The Department of Education's Education Longitudinal Study provides a dataset that could lead to such an analysis.

**Epistemology.** The majority of research that examines Latinos' success at two-year institutions employ similar epistemologies. Many of these studies utilize a constructivist or a critical lens to better understand the Latino postsecondary experience. While helpful, the overreliance on these epistemological perspectives does not allow for a broad study of Latino success at community colleges. Research studies should employ a positivist perspective to study the factors that impact Latino student success at community colleges. Through this approach, researchers can conduct studies with the goal of better predicting, explaining and generalizing Latinos experience at community colleges (Jones, Torres, & Arminio 2013). A study utilizing a national database would provide the ideal sample and approach to gain an understanding of Latinos at community colleges.

### **Implications**

**Practice.** This literature review provides practitioners with a starting point to help ensure Latino success at community colleges. First, community college leaders should draw on emerging national practices, such as mandatory new student orientation, that can positively impact Latino student success. By participating in an orientation program, students can learn vital information that is critical to their success in community college and begin to develop relationships with other students (Center for Community College Student Engagement, 2012). Organizations like Achieving the Dream provide a platform for community leaders to gather and discuss the implementation of mandatory orientation and other emerging practices (Achieving the Dream, 2013).

Second, Faculty and staff should strive to create an open and welcoming environment for Latino students enrolled in two-year institutions. Providing flexible office hours, showing interest in a student's cultural background and serving in a mentorship role can help these students feel connected to the campus and in turn increase the likelihood of completing their Associate's degree and in turn Bachelor's degrees (Torres & Hernandez, 2010). Advisors at community colleges have an important role to play and if necessary can engage in "intrusive advising practices" in order to ensure that Latinos are on track for success. Many of these practices include: mandatory first-year orientation, personal phone calls to students, mandatory meetings, emails and social media posts (Center for Community College Student Engagement, 2012).

Third, practitioners should have a clear understanding of institutional, state and federal policies and practices that will allow Latino students to successfully transition to four-year institutions. State transfer and articulation policies hold promise for improving the success of students transferring from community colleges to four-year institutions (Center on Reinventing

Public Education, 2008). Advisors should be knowledgeable about how courses are numbered and how credits transfer at local and major institutions within the state.

**Policy.** This literature review provides state and federal policymakers with a starting point to help to ensure Latino success at community colleges. At the state level, policymakers should consider methods to help reduce the cost of attending community colleges. To help reduce the cost state policymakers should increase funding for two-year public institutions. Since 2007, state funding for higher education has steadily declined, with funding for community colleges more severely impacted than traditional four-year institutions (American Council on Education, 2012; American Association of Community College, 2007). States should consider increasing funding for higher education, in particular community colleges.

State policymakers should also consider innovative practices to help reduce the cost of college for Latinos. In Tennessee, for example, policymakers have developed Tennessee Promise, a scholarship which allows high school graduates to pursue two years of tuition free-community or technical college in the state (Inside Higher Education, 2015). Although this initiative alleviates some of the financial burden on students, it does not cover additional expenses like transportation, books and fees that place a large burden on students (Sheehy, 2014). State policymakers should build on Tennessee Promise by expanding the scope of the scholarship to include: books, fees and all applicable transportation. If implemented correctly, an expanded version of Tennessee Promise can defray the cost of community college and in turn allow Latinos students the opportunity to focus on completing their degrees and transferring to a four-year institution.

Federal policymakers have a large role to play in ensuring Latino success at community colleges. Latinos at two-year institutions have little knowledge of the resources available to help assist with reducing their college costs. Latinos also struggle with various issues including access to financial resources such as tax credits, food assistance and public health insurance (Excelencia in Education, 2013). Federal policymakers can provide Latinos better information on the postsecondary education system providing information like where students can access key community college resources. Since coming into office, President Obama has worked tirelessly toward this goal. The Obama Administration has developed tools that promote transparency and accountability such as College the Affordability and Transparency Center and implemented initiatives in hopes of increasing Latino college completion (Munoz, 2015). Although these initiatives provide a positive step, they do not entirely fulfill the goal of increasing Latino postsecondary success. The federal government should take additional steps to ensure that information is getting into the hands of Latino students as they make the choice of which community college to attend. This means, altering current tools to provide a specific focus on community colleges and providing a translated version of both the College Affordability and Transparency so that all Latinos enrolling postsecondary can utilize these initiatives.

### **Conclusion**

Today, community colleges are the best representation of the shifting landscape of higher education in the United States. Two-year institutions have varied missions where they are asked to educate the future of tomorrow and retrain today's workers. As the demographics of our nation continue to shift and Latinos continue to enroll in postsecondary schools in record numbers, community colleges will play a larger role in the shaping of the future of our nation. In order to ensure the success of Latinos, community colleges should focus their efforts on ensuring

a smooth transition in and out of the institution. That means providing support to ensure Latinos' academic and social integration into the fabric of higher education and a clear understanding of the environmental factors that are pushing and pulling Latinos away from completing their degrees. The failure of community colleges to provide this support jeopardizes not only the future of Latinos in the United States, but also the future of our nation.

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### *About the Author*

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### *Discussion Questions*

1. What are key issues to Latino students enrolling and succeeding in postsecondary education?
2. How can policymakers and practitioners work to ensure that more Latino students are on the path to success?
3. Under a Donald J. Trump administration, what is the future of community colleges in the United States?
4. How can other types of higher education institutions improve their practices to increase Latino completion rates?

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## In Defense of Fanon's Conception of the Struggle to the Death

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### Abstract

In this article, I examine two competing interpretations of Hegel's "master-slave dialectic" from his classic text, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. These interpretations, offered by Frantz Fanon and Ato Sekyi-Otu, disagree on what they hold to be the central feature of Hegel's conception of the process of obtaining mutual recognition. While Fanon upholds the importance of the violent nature of the struggle "to the death," Sekyi-Otu criticizes this endorsement of violence and aims to highlight instead the features of reciprocity and mutuality. I argue that Fanon's focus on the violent nature of the struggle can withstand this criticism, seeing it as essential that oppressed groups play a role in obtaining their own recognition from the dominant groups in power. Considering this in modern contexts allows us to shed light on current resistance efforts, and how true independence and the possibility of recognition for marginalized groups often requires the willingness to "risk one's life" or "struggle to the death" for recognition. As such, I endorse Fanon's reading of Hegel's dialectic and consider how it can be applied to contemporary social movements.

### Introduction

He who is reluctant to recognize me is against me. In a fierce struggle I am willing to feel the shudder of death, the irreversible extinction, but also the possibility of impossibility" (Fanon, 2008, p. 193).

Despite the age of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's influential work, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (originally published in 1807), the text is still viewed as having many relevant aspects that are still being reviewed, analyzed, and contested in contemporary contexts. One particularly illuminating passage comes out of the description of the form of consciousness that Hegel calls "Self-Consciousness" (Hegel, 1977, p. 104).<sup>4</sup> In this passage, Hegel articulates the relationship between two self-consciousnesses,<sup>5</sup> each attempting to validate their own self and elevate their subjective certainty to objective truth (as cited in Sekyi-

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<sup>4</sup> Hegel (1977) states in paragraph 175 that "*Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness*" (Hegel, 1977, p. 110). He introduces the Lordship and Bondage metaphor, which has come to be known in the literature as the "master-slave dialectic" beginning at paragraph 178. I will be referring to the content of these passages as the master-slave dialectic throughout.

<sup>5</sup> Hegel develops the two self-consciousnesses as lord (master) and bondsman (slave). He describes the self-consciousness that is master as the consciousness that "exists *for itself*" (Hegel 1977, p. 115). The slave, however, is in bondage and is necessarily tied to the master (Hegel, 1977, 115). Each seeks recognition as an independent self-consciousness from the other.

Otu, 1996, p. 57).<sup>6</sup> Each form of self-consciousness desires to be recognized by the other, for each self-consciousness exists “only in being acknowledged” (Hegel, 1977, p. 111). Hegel seeks to explain the process that aspires to bring about mutual recognition between the two self-consciousnesses, an aim that is ultimately unsuccessful by the end of the dialectic, whereby the desired mutual recognition is not achieved.

Throughout this section, Hegel makes clear that the process of attaining mutual recognition necessarily involves a violent struggle between the two self-consciousnesses, and a willingness of each to risk their lives in the struggle for recognition. He states in paragraph 187: “The presentation of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing... that it is not attached to life” (Hegel, 1977, p. 113). This being unattached to life is two-fold, viz., each self-consciousness “seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves *the staking of its own life*” (Hegel, 1977, p. 113, emphasis not in original). These aspects of the “life-and-death struggle” (Hegel, 1977, p. 114) for recognition between competing self-consciousnesses (the violent struggle, the willingness to stake one’s life for recognition) have been taken up by various theorists who analyze Hegel’s now widely cited articulation of the master-slave dialectic, and many have come to competing conclusions about the relative importance of each aspect to the overall dialectic. One important reading of Hegel’s master slave dialectic has been advanced by philosopher and critical theorist Frantz Fanon (2008), who addresses the centrality of the *violent struggle* in the process of slaves obtaining recognition from their masters, both within the theoretical master-slave dialectic and in real world accounts of master-slave relations. However, not all scholars who examine the dialectic attribute a similar degree of importance to the *violent* nature of the struggle, and others who have analyzed the passage have criticized Fanon’s account.

One important criticism of Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic has been raised by Ato Sekyi-Otu (1996) who rejects Fanon’s emphasis on the violent nature of the struggle for recognition. Sekyi-Otu interprets the dialectic in such a way as to highlight the importance of reciprocity and mutuality in the recognition process, minimizing the emphasis on the role of violence in the struggle for recognition. In this article, I will be defending Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic, lending support for his claim that when “recognition”<sup>7</sup> is merely given to the slave by the master, without the slave independently demanding it, the hierarchical power dynamics are reinforced, such that the master exclusively is in a position to recognize the slave (or not). Following Fanon, I contend that when recognition is bestowed on the subordinate self-consciousness by the dominant self-consciousness, the hierarchy is maintained such that the dependence of the slave on the values and determinations of the master is reinforced. Recognition, then, remains in the master’s control, which deprives slaves of the mutuality of being recognized *on their own terms*. Without the slaves playing an active role in demanding their recognition from masters,

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<sup>6</sup> Frantz Fanon (2008) elaborates upon the importance of recognition by another for achieving certainty of one’s self-consciousness. Fanon states: “Each consciousness of self is in quest of absoluteness. It wants to be recognized as a primal value without reference to life, as a transformation of subjective certainty (Gewissheit) into objective truth (Wahrheit)” (Fanon, 2008, p. 192).

<sup>7</sup> By “recognition” here, I am referring to the recognition of the independence of the other self-consciousness, here being the slave. The claim is that when masters choose to recognize their slaves, of their own will and not as a result of slaves demanding their recognition, the power of the masters (and not the slaves) is reinforced. The masters remain in a position of being able to choose whether or not to recognize the independent self-consciousness of the other—they are not being forced to do so. This leads to a merely illusory independence for the slave, but not an independence that is actual.

recognition can never be truly mutual, and will always necessarily be one-sided in favor of the masters. Even if the type of mutual recognition that Hegel's dialectic aspires to reach were met, Hegel's account still leaves the slaves falling short of reaching full subjectivity. The master does not need to be recognized on their own terms, but this is crucial for the slave who realizes that the master is dependent on the slave and the products of the slave's labor. Full recognition of the slave as an independent self-consciousness requires recognition of the complex aspects of their violent struggle to the death for recognition, which are not necessary in recognizing the master.

### **I. Fanon's Account of the Dialectic: On the Violent Struggle to the Death for Recognition**

In order to understand Sekyi-Otu's criticisms of Fanon's position on the violent struggle for recognition, it is first necessary to examine Fanon's argument. Fanon's account of the centrality of the violent nature of the struggle for recognition is given in his book *Black Skin, White Masks* (2008).<sup>8</sup> In the section entitled "The Black Man and Hegel," Fanon presents his understanding of Hegel's theoretical master-slave relationship, arguing that historically, Hegel's theoretical dialectic was inconsistent with the historical realities of how things actually played out between French slaves and their masters. Fanon suggests that the recognition of French slaves was achieved without conflict, viz., without this recognition being demanded by the slaves themselves. Rather, recognition was granted to slaves when masters *decided* to "raise the animal-machine man to the supreme rank of *man*" (Fanon, 2008, p. 194). Fanon argues that this weak recognition, given to the slaves by the master rather than struggled for and demanded by the slaves themselves, is useless. To enforce his point, Fanon quotes Hegel himself, stating that, "Action from one side only would be useless... *they recognize themselves by mutually recognizing each other*" (Fanon, 2008, p. 192).<sup>9</sup> Fanon's direct citation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* helps to illustrate his point that this type of recognition, that which is granted to the slave by the master without a struggle on the part of the slave, will not lead to mutual recognition. Granting of recognition to the slave by the master simply reinforces the dominance of the master and does not allow for the slave to gain independence through the process of demanding to be recognized. As the passage from the *Phenomenology* articulates, these instances of one-sided recognition are useless if the goal is to obtain the mutuality Hegel's dialectic sets out to achieve.

Fanon argues that a slave's active struggle or demand for recognition from the master is necessary to gain true independence. He again quotes Hegel's *Phenomenology*, which states, "It is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained" (Hegel quoted in Fanon, 2008, p. 192). Fanon interprets this to mean that independence or affirmation of self can only be achieved through conflict and at times, may even require armed violence. Fanon illustrates this by arguing that when French masters decided to recognize slaves as persons, the slaves did not have to struggle or fight for this recognition, and thus, according to Fanon, cannot be truly and meaningfully free or independent.<sup>10</sup> Being given recognition and being declared free by their masters affords slaves

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<sup>8</sup> Fanon's *Black Skins, White Masks* was originally published in 1952, but was translated and published in English in 1967. The translation used here is translated by Richard Philcox in 2008, Grove Press, New York, NY. Fanon examines Hegel's dialectic in a subsection of the chapter "The Black Man and Recognition" found in this edition on pages 191-197.

<sup>9</sup> The quote Fanon is using from *The Phenomenology* can be found at paragraph 184 (Hegel, 1977, p. 112).

<sup>10</sup> It is important to note the relation between the terms recognition, freedom, and independence as used in Fanon's analysis of the dialectic. When he is referring to the theoretical struggle for recognition, he is primarily focusing on how recognition is necessary for independence of self. When he transitions into his discussion of French

the *illusion* of freedom, but genuine independence belongs exclusively to the master, who had the power to freely choose whether or not to recognize the slaves as free, independent selves. Fanon states, “The black man is a slave who was allowed to assume the master’s attitude. The white man is a master who allowed his slaves to eat at his table” (Fanon, 2008, p. 194). Note Fanon’s usage of the phrase “was allowed” in reference to the slave, whose actions have to be permitted by the master, implying that the slave is not genuinely free or independent. The master, however, is in a position to do the allowing; the master is able to grant permission to the slave to sit at *his* table (note that the ownership is also in the hands of the master), and so it is by the will of the master only that the slave is able to assume an *illusion* of independence. Fanon’s brilliant selection of words illustrates his point that in the absence of conflict and violent struggle on the part of the slave, the illusory freedom granted the slave does not afford the slave a true independence; the slave is unable to gain independence from the master. The slave is not recognized as an independent equal in the eyes of the master (again, note Fanon’s intentional usage of “is allowed” and “allows”). Thus, the slave is not truly free at all, even upon the master’s declaration of their freedom, and the two self-consciousnesses fall short of mutually recognizing each other, the goal of the dialectic.<sup>11</sup>

Given that Fanon has illustrated the impossibility of genuine mutual recognition and true independence for the slaves when their “freedom” is merely bestowed upon them by their masters, Fanon goes on to emphasize the importance of slaves’ *activity* in obtaining their recognition from the masters, as opposed to merely being *acted on*. Slaves must come to know the cost of freedom (Fanon, 2008, p. 195), and must be willing to risk their lives in pursuit of it. Furthermore, Fanon understands that this struggle for recognition of independence is often violent in nature, because the colonizing practices that enslaved so many people were violent in nature. For Fanon, violence—and sometimes armed violence—is justified, and indeed often necessary, for the colonized to free themselves from their colonizers and to be recognized as independent selves. He also points out that colonizers use violence and oppression to gain recognition as masters from those they are colonizing. The struggle for recognition then, demands a violent response from the colonized to force the colonizers to recognize their true independence. He states, “we are told that none of this is given free” (Fanon, 2008, p. 196). Genuine independence of self and freedom for slaves will never be given, it must be demanded and taken from the masters.

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slaves being “freed” by their masters, he begins talking about the notion of freedom (for example, “As master, the white man now told the black man: ‘You are now free’”) (Fanon, 2008, p. 195). Fanon seems to be suggesting that recognition of another, as a truly independent self, is essential for that person’s being truly free. In these ways, genuine recognition and mutuality are preconditions for genuine freedom, on Fanon’s account.

<sup>11</sup> It is also important for Fanon that masters recognize slaves *as they are*, in their genuine difference. Fanon notes that masters often deny difference, in a shallow attempt at mutuality that again is illusory and falls short of genuine recognition. Fanon states: “The white man says to him: ‘Brother, there is no difference between us.’ But the black man *knows* there is a difference. He *wants* it” (Fanon, 2008, p. 196). I think this is important to note in light of the application I am making to the contemporary racial context in America. Given the push towards so-called “colorblind” ideologies that claim racial neutrality and reject racial difference, Fanon’s quote can remind us that genuine recognition requires coming to see people as independent selves *in their many differences*. When the masters deny that there are any differences between them and the slaves, they are masking differences that are important to the slaves and who they are. Genuine recognition requires seeing and appreciating differences, not masking them in pursuit of superficial neutrality.

## II. Sekyi-Otu's Objection: A Rejection of the Role of Violence in the Dialectic and a Turn Toward Mutuality

Given this understanding of Fanon's interpretation of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, Ato Sekyi-Otu finds Fanon's account overly pessimistic; Sekyi-Otu rejects Fanon's claim that the "freedom" that is merely "given" to slaves by masters is not actual. As Sekyi-Otu points out, given their subordinate status, this is the most likely route of enslaved persons obtaining freedom and this method requires no conflict, struggle, or death. Why then does Fanon insist on slaves' active role in obtaining their own freedom, endorsing means of violent conflict, if it is possible for slaves to obtain freedom (not necessarily genuine independence, but at least non-slavery) without it?

Ato Sekyi-Otu poses this question in regard to Fanon's insistence on the violence within the struggle for freedom. In *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* (1996), Sekyi-Otu analyzes Fanon's application of Hegel's master-slave dialectic to colonial racial systems. Whereas Fanon emphasizes the violent aspects fundamental to the struggle for recognition, Sekyi-Otu argues that this is not actually the most essential part of the dialectic. Instead, Sekyi-Otu (1996) takes the essential part of the dialectical experience of master and slave to be *reciprocity*, or the recognition of the mutual dependence on one another (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, p. 56). Sekyi-Otu argues that Fanon is recalling and focusing on the violent aspect of Hegel's passage about the process of searching for mutual recognition at the expense of considerations for the importance of reciprocity. While Sekyi-Otu is willing to acknowledge that the violent aspect Fanon emphasizes can certainly be found in a reading of this section of the *Phenomenology*, he disagrees with Fanon's insistence on its critical importance. He also points out that the "result of this violent confrontation, however, cannot be the death of one partner and the survival of the other. The death of one participant would eliminate the possibility of recognition by the other" (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, p. 57). Mutual recognition requires both parties, so the struggle cannot actually be "to the death." In this way, Sekyi-Otu believes that the violent conflict Fanon sees as essential to mutual recognition can indeed hinder mutual recognition, or even render it impossible.

Sekyi-Otu argues that Fanon's account of the master-slave dialectic underscores the primacy of the notion of reciprocity, or the idea that the slave and master are dependent upon each other as well as the idea that slaves obtain a sense of independence through their labor and their ability to see themselves in the things they create in the world. Sekyi-Otu takes these aspects of Hegel's dialectic to be absent in Fanon's analysis, leading him to read Fanon's work as unnecessarily pessimistic, insofar as it does not allow the independence of the slave to be redeemed through their labor in the ways the dialectic in the *Phenomenology* suggests (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, pp. 58-9). Additionally, Sekyi-Otu considers Fanon's claim that freedom is exclusively dependent on the proclamation of the master, leaving the slave entirely inactive in the process, is problematic insofar as it ignores the possibility of the slave gaining independence through recognizing him/herself in the objects of their labor. He argues that Fanon's account is not really representative of Hegel's theoretical bondsman from the dialectic, but is actually closer to Nietzsche's conception of the slave (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, pp. 60-61). Sekyi-Otu points out that interpreters of Fanon have largely disagreed about whether or not Fanon's application of the master-slave dialectic is an appropriate interpretation of Hegel or a total misreading of Hegel. Those who think Fanon has unfairly applied Hegel think so primarily because they hold that Fanon has largely disregarded the redemptive property of slave labor, and the possibility of independence through the objects of that labor. Sekyi-Otu points out that Fanon has written that

the slave might even abandon the object of his labor, a suggestion that Sekyi-Otu calls an “aborted dialectic”—a move so far from Hegel’s intended meaning of the dialectical interaction that it is no longer interpreting the dialectic as Hegel presented it (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, pp. 60-61). Abandoning the object of labor, Sekyi-Otu argues, removes the ability for redemption of the “inessential” slave to a status of “immanent necessity” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, pp. 60-61). He thinks Fanon’s interpretation could not be further from the “story of liberation which Hegel’s dialectic enables the *Phenomenology* to tell” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, pp. 60-61). Instead, Sekyi-Otu thinks Fanon is telling a story closer to that of the conflictual portrait of human interaction painted by Jean Paul Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*. If his reading of Fanon is indeed correct, then it would seem as if Hegel’s dialectic is unable to accurately portray the historical reality of slaves and masters in the colonial context (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, pp. 60-61).

Sekyi-Otu is highlighting an important ideal by trying to recapture the significance of the notion of reciprocity in the dialectic; this ideal is relationships of mutuality and reciprocity among individuals regarded as equals, though of course, this is not where Hegel’s dialectic leads us. However, just as he accuses Fanon of ignoring the centrality of reciprocity, Sekyi-Otu ignores the importance of the violent struggle to the death that is just as equally a part of the dialectic Hegel presents. It seems problematic to ignore *either* aspect of the dialectic, when an accurate reading of the passage would surely require attention to both. Just as mutuality is the end goal of the dialectic, the violent struggle is an essential means of moving towards that end. For instance, Hegel presents the staking of one’s life as central: in the passage, self-consciousness had to risk going “beyond life toward an ideal that is the transformation of subjective certainty of my own worth into a universally valid objective truth” (Fanon, 2008, p. 193). This is indeed a struggle to the death, and only a willingness to die is strong enough to confirm the desire to be recognized and affirmed. If the slave is never able to demand this recognition of the master, or never able to stake his life, he will never have a true sense of his own independence, and the master will not take him seriously as an independent consciousness. If the slave’s freedom does not come by the slave’s own demands, but instead comes by the decision of the master, this reinforces the independence of the master, not the slave. The slave’s fate is once again in the hands of the master. For this reason, it is fair and justified for Fanon to argue that this is not true independence for the slave, which makes mutual recognition impossible.

### **III. Defending the Appropriateness of Fanon’s Reading: Historical Considerations**

In defending Fanon’s interpretation of Hegel, it is interesting to consider the background conditions of Hegel’s writing of the *Phenomenology*, and how the context might suggest that Hegel did indeed intend to emphasize the role of resistance, and at times even violent resistance, in his analysis of the master-slave dialectic. For example, there is historical evidence to support the idea that Hegel was fascinated by resistance efforts among slaves in their attempts to demand freedom and recognition. In fact, historical correspondence suggests that Hegel was fascinated in particular by the events of the Haitian Revolution, which he read about in German press. In an interesting article that documents Hegel’s likely interest in the events of the Haitian Revolution, Susan Buck-Morss (2000) attempts to situate the *Phenomenology* within its specific historical and philosophical context to better understand Hegel’s motivations and influences when composing the work. Throughout the article, she illuminates the stark disconnect between Western philosophers’ analysis of freedom and slavery and the practices that were taking place

in that same historical moment. She explains that by the 18th century, Enlightenment thinkers used slavery, which she describes as the “systematic, highly sophisticated capitalist enslavement of non-Europeans as a labor force in the colonies” as the “root metaphor... connoting everything that was evil about power relations” (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 821). They contrasted this with freedom, which was often articulated as the “highest and universal political value” (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 821). But, as she points out, as these philosophical comparisons of slavery and freedom were gaining intellectual traction, the economic practice of slavery was also rapidly increasing. Buck-Morss (2000) argues that this discrepancy between abstract thought and actual practice was fueled by the acceptance of “the exploitation of millions of colonial slave laborers” as part of the given world “by the very thinkers who proclaimed freedom to be man’s natural state and inalienable right” (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 822). She goes on to give examples of how freedom for enslaved peoples, though represented as a theoretical ideal by these Western thinkers, did not become realized as a result of their “ideals of universal freedom” or “revolutionary ideas,” (Buck Morss, 2000, p. 833) but instead occurred as a result of the very manifestations of violent resistance that Fanon (2008) defends. She illustrates this in her examination of France and French colonies. She states:

It took years of bloodshed before slavery—really existing slavery, not merely its metaphorical analogy—was abolished in the French colonies... Although abolition of slavery was the only possible logical outcome of the ideal of universal freedom, it did not come about through the revolutionary ideas or even the revolutionary actions of the French; it came about through the actions of the slaves themselves. (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 833)

She specifically references the struggle of the colony of Saint-Domingue, where in 1791 over a half-million slaves “took the struggle for liberty into their own hands, not through petitions, but through violent, organized revolt” (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 833). She explains how in 1794, the armed black slaves of the colony forced the French Republic to abolish slavery on the island and other French colonies. The former slaves, now free, fought British forces from 1794 to 1800, which sought to reestablish slavery on the island. However, under the leadership of Toussaint-Louverture, the slaves were able to defeat the British military, ultimately bringing about suspension of the British slave trade in 1807. In 1801, Toussaint-Louverture wrote a constitution for the colony and in 1804 the new military leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines finalized the declaration of independence of the island from France, thus “combining the end of slavery with the end of colonial status” (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 835) The newly declared independent state was to be called Haiti. In an unprecedented act of revolt, enslaved persons, through violent resistance, were able to demand their recognition, freedom, and independence from their former masters.

The Haitian revolution as described above was widely covered in the German press, including in the journal *Minerva*, of which Hegel was a regular reader (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 842). Buck-Morss suggests that the coverage of the Haitian Revolution was the source of inspiration for Hegel’s account of the relationship between master and slave as presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The Haitian Revolution represented a clear instance of the violent, struggle to the death for freedom that Hegel articulates (and Fanon defends). She notes that the *Phenomenology* was written in 1805-1806, and was published in 1807, the year in which Britain passed the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act of 1807. Despite the evidence that Buck-Morss

suggests clearly indicates that Hegel was inspired by the current events of his time, she notes that other scholars and intellectuals locate the source of ideas for Hegel's work elsewhere, such as in the writings of Plato and Aristotle (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 843).<sup>12</sup> Other scholars resist such connections to intellectual predecessors or historical events altogether, instead considering Hegel's formulation of the dialectic to be an entirely abstract example that was theorized independent of, and disconnected from, real world situations and philosophical precursors (Buck-Morss, 2000, p. 843). As Buck-Morss points out, it is hard to believe that Hegel was completely ignorant to the events of the Haitian Revolution, and incredibly likely that Hegel was not only aware of the events in Haiti, but was intrigued by them, leading him to articulate the dialectic of slave and master in response to his contemporary context.

Whether or not Buck-Morss is correct in her claim that Hegel was aware of the events of the Haitian slave revolution and wrote the passage of the *Phenomenology* in response to them is up for debate, and will likely never be answered definitively one way or another. However, whatever Hegel's true inspiration for the dialectic, we can certainly examine the events of the Haitian Revolution in light of the dialectic. Doing so, I contend, offers a clear historical representation of Fanon's interpretation of the dialectic. In this actual historical instance of a dialectical encounter between masters and slaves, the white masters (and political leaders and intellectuals), despite claiming to value freedom and independence universally, were quite unlikely to ever grant that freedom and independence to their colonial slaves. This is likely a result of the political and economic advantages (for the masters) of arrangements of colonialism and enslavement, despite the theoretical inconsistency with their burgeoning commitments to freedom and independence as political and philosophical ideals. In this historical instance, as demonstrated above, slaves had to take the struggle for freedom into their own hands, viz., they had to engage in a violent struggle to the death, in which they were able to stake their own lives for their freedom and for recognition of their independence. It is quite unlikely that the masters would have willingly and voluntarily given up the many advantages bestowed on them by arrangements of colonial enslavement. Thus, it is unlikely that a more reciprocal, egalitarian approach to recognition, such as the one advanced by Ato Sekyi-Otu would have ever brought freedom and independence to the slaves under the given circumstances. To gain their freedom, the slaves had to demand it—to engage in violent revolt—and claim recognition from their masters. Whether or not Hegel was inspired by the events of the Haitian Revolution, and I believe Susan Buck-Morss (2000) prevents a compelling case that he was, the events of the Haitian Revolution provide support for Fanon's reading of the dialectic, and what is most likely to be effective in bringing about recognition, freedom, and independence for enslaved peoples in real life contexts.

#### **IV: Applying Fanon's Interpretation: An Examination of the Struggle for Recognition in Contemporary Contexts**

Employing Fanon's analysis of Hegel's master-slave dialectic to more contemporary situations of dominance and subordination can help strengthen the case for the defense of Fanon's position. For instance, examining The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s-1960s can provide a more recent example of individuals who are willing to stake their lives for their

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<sup>12</sup> For an example of another scholar who locates Hegel's inspiration for the passage in his intellectual predecessors, as opposed to his witnessing social and political events around him, see Remo Bodei (2007). Bodei argues that Hegel followed Aristotle in his articulation of the master-slave dialectic.

recognition, as well as the often-necessary violent nature of this struggle. This is true, I contend, of both violent and non-violent approaches to The Civil Rights Movement. In non-violent protests and acts of civil disobedience, the individuals who are participating are still acting out a mode of resistance to the dominant group, and are still exhibiting a willingness to stake their lives for their cause, as made evident by the numerous individuals who were killed, beaten, hosed, and so on for their acts of resistance. John Ansbro (1988) recalls, for instance, the spirit of resistance in Martin Luther King Jr., a figure largely associated with non-violent modes of resistance to injustice. Ansbro details how a young King, faced with countless traumatic experiences of the brutality of segregation, became “fascinated with the notion of noncooperation with an evil system” (Ansbro, 1988, para. 5). King, Ansbro writes, “appealed to his followers to be true to their consciences and not to cooperate with an evil system that refused to recognize their personal dignity” (Ansbro, 1988, para. 5). In this quote, we can see King’s appeal to the importance of *recognition* for the oppressed black people that he was leading in protest. He also calls on his followers to take action, through noncooperation with the unjust system, in pursuit of their recognition. This is consistent with Fanon’s account of the dialectic that requires those in the slave position to take matters into their own hands and demand their recognition from their oppressors. Interestingly, Ansbro points out that King was inspired by the work of Hegel, citing King as calling Hegel his “favorite philosopher” during the Montgomery Boycott (Ansbro, 1988, para. 11). He writes:

King readily identified with Hegel’s insight that conflict is essential to progress and that each synthesis –that is that each achievement of a degree of freedom – can become a new point of departure for further struggles for total freedom. Hegel had indicated that seriousness, suffering, patience, and labor of the negative constitute the dialectical life of the spirit in search for freedom. King reaffirmed this principle by his contention that the passionate concern of dedicated individuals as well as their sacrifices, struggles, and tireless exertions are necessary for every step toward the goal of justice. (Ansbro, 1988, para. 12-13)

We can see in this connection between Hegel and the non-violent philosophy of resistance of Martin Luther King Jr. that *activity* in the struggle for resistance can take many forms, and not all of these forms are necessarily violent. However, consistent with Fanon’s reading of the dialectic, Martin Luther King Jr.’s leadership in the Civil Rights Movement, through various forms of non-violent protests and civil disobedience, reflects the importance of oppressed persons demanding their recognition and independence, through a struggle that is often violent in nature (even if it is not intended to be), and for which participants are willing to risk their life in pursuit of that recognition.

Of course, Martin Luther King was not the only important leader of the Civil Rights Movement, and non-violent civil disobedience was not the only philosophy of resistance employed during that time. More actively aggressive, and at times violent, approaches to black liberation during the era of the Civil Rights Movement were also advanced, for instance the methods advocated by Malcolm X. Malcolm X recognized that violence, specifically in the form of self-defense, could be a legitimate response for black individuals to take when they found themselves in unsafe and unjust environments. He stated:

We assert in those areas where government is either unable or unwilling to protect the lives and property of our people, that our people are within their rights to protect themselves by whatever means necessary. A man with a rifle or club can only be stopped by a person with a rifle or club. (Malcom X as cited in Breitman, 1967, pp. 106-7)

I take the violence that Malcolm X is promoting in this quote to be justified—not unnecessary or unwarranted. This quote, and the general philosophy advanced by Malcolm X, acknowledges that violence can, at times, be justified in response to violent systems, *especially* when that violence represents a form of self-defense or a step in the direction of liberation. When social and political systems are structured such that black lives are not being valued and/or protected by that system, this very well may necessitate that black persons take matters into their own hands to protect themselves and/or to demand recognition from that system on their own terms. If the systems that black people found themselves in were more just, and offered equal amounts of necessary protections and resources to black persons as it provides to white persons, (viz., if black persons were afforded equal recognition by various social systems as white persons), violent forms of resistance would never be justified (or for that matter, necessary). However, there are many reasons to believe that we are not in such a system at all, but rather we are in a social system that disproportionately advantages white people while systematically disadvantaging people of color. When society is structured such that white people (masters, if you will), are able to get away with perpetrating violence against black individuals without consequence, then black persons (representative of a slave class), are put in a position to have to defend themselves and to fight for their equal recognition. Often, responses by those in the oppressed position (black people in American society) will be violent, because the oppression that keeps them in the subjugated position is violent. On this, Malcolm X stated:

Tactics based solely on morality can only succeed when you are dealing with basically moral people or a moral system. A man or system which opposes a man because of his color is not moral. It is the duty of every African-American community throughout this country to protect its people against mass murderers, bombers, lynchers, floggers, brutalizers, and exploiters. (Malcom X as cited in Breitman, 1967, pp. 106-7)

Malcolm X's ideas of black self-defense in response to corrupt systems and immoral societies that fail to recognize black individuals can help shed light on more recent activist movements, such as the current Black Lives Matter Movement. The Black Lives Matter Movement is a racial justice organization and movement that arose in 2013 in the wake of the acquittal of George Zimmerman after he shot and killed a black teen, Trayvon Martin.<sup>13</sup> The movement has gained further attention and support in response to various additional murders of young, unarmed black men, whose white shooters, often law enforcement officers, were either not indicted or not found guilty upon being indicted. The movement gained attention for its

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<sup>13</sup> Interestingly, Ciccariello-Maher (2012) has analyzed the conflict between Martin and Zimmerman, and ultimately Martin's murder by Zimmerman, through the lens of Fanon's interpretation of Hegel's dialectic. This application of Fanon's reformulated dialectic to gain insight into the murder of Trayvon Martin lends support to my claim that Fanon offers the most informative understanding of the dialectic, particularly for its use in contemporary applications.

demonstrations and protests responding to several deaths of unarmed black folks following the 2013 murder of Trayvon Martin, including the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, Samuel DuBose, Freddie Gray, and several unforgotten others.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the widespread criticisms that have been leveled against the Black Lives Matter Movement, there is a wide array of evidence to support their claims of injustice in the so-called criminal “justice” system, particularly directed against people of color. Furthermore, despite only recently getting substantial attention, the issues being challenged by the Black Lives Matter movement (primarily mass incarceration and police brutality against people of color) are not new problems. In a 1976 article, John Goldkamp compares the rates of minority deaths by capital punishment to the rates of deaths in the process of apprehending suspected minority criminals. He argues that although evidence of racial disproportion in capital punishment has been widely discussed, even suspended in 1972 by the Supreme Court, that equal consideration has not been given to the decades’ worth of studies that have shown that racial minorities are disproportionately killed by deadly force, by individual officers in high pressure situations (Goldkamp, 1976, pp.169-183). The racial disparity in minorities being killed by deadly force evidenced in the work of John Goldkamp continues to be relevant, even in the year 2015. An article in *The Washington Post* chronicles various cases of the murders of unarmed black men in 2015; when the article was published in August, there had been 24 such cases. The article reports that black men accounted for 40% of the victims of shootings of unarmed individuals, although they only constitute 6% of the U.S population (Somashekhar et al., 2015, para. 8). This means that unarmed black men are seven times more likely than their white counterparts to die by police gunfire while unarmed (Somashekhar et al., 2015, para. 8). Clearly, Black Lives Matter supporters have a point when they claim that unarmed black men are being killed at disproportionate rates, as reflected by the statistics. This disproportionate and unjust treatment of black people by the criminal justice system represents a failure of recognition of the their independent self-consciousnesses, and the reality that the struggle for that recognition is as Fanon understands, often a violent struggle.

Not only are black individuals being killed at disproportionate rates through capital punishment and police shootings, but they are also incarcerated at disproportionate rates, making up an alarming portion of the imprisoned population in the United States.<sup>15</sup> An October, 2015 story in *The Atlantic* reports the following statistics:

In absolute terms, America’s prison and jail population from 1970 until today has increased sevenfold, from some 300,000 people to 2.2 million. The United States now accounts for less than 5 percent of the world’s inhabitants—and about 25 percent of its incarcerated inhabitants. In 2000, one in 10 black males between the ages of 20 and 40 were incarcerated—10 times the rate of their white peers. In 2010, a third of all black male high-school dropouts between the ages of 20 and 39 were imprisoned, compared with only 13 percent of their white peers. (Coates, 2015, para. 16)

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<sup>14</sup> For more information on the activist group and racial justice movement, Black Lives Matter, or to find out how to get involved, see their website at <http://blacklivesmatter.com>.

<sup>15</sup> For a more comprehensive analysis of the racialized system of mass incarceration in the United States, see Michelle Alexander’s 2010 book *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*. Alexander provides compelling and jarring statistics on the racial dimensions of mass incarceration in the United States, and particularly on its racial dimensions. She argues that mass incarceration of black bodies in the United States is a new racial caste system, following the tradition of slavery and Jim Crow.

This boils down to the following alarming statistic: “One in four black men born since the late 1970s has spent time in prison” (Coates, 2015, para. 23). Interestingly, as the rate of imprisonment is escalating, the rate of imprisonment for violent crimes is decreasing, and we are seeing more people, especially black people, being jailed for non-violent crimes.<sup>16</sup> There is much more to be said about the unequal and unjust treatment of black persons by the criminal justice system in America. However, rather than criticizing activist groups who are displaying resistance towards these oppressive institutions, such as the Black Lives Matters Movement, we ought to consider the legitimate reasons for these resistance efforts. Further, given Fanon’s interpretation of Hegel’s master- slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology*, we can consider how these active forms of resistance are playing an important role in the continued struggle for black recognition.

A criticism that plagues Fanon’s analysis, as highlighted by Sekyi-Otu, one which might also be leveled against these applications to current forms of active resistance, is the lingering question of why these active struggles and modes of resistance would be favored over a more reciprocal, mutual process of recognition. Following Fanon, I argue against these criticisms, and I do so on two grounds. First, a non-violent bestowing of recognition onto an oppressed group, without the active struggle of that group, leaves the fate of the oppressed group in the hands of those in the dominant position. This means that the oppressors are still free to determine, when, if ever, those in the oppressed position are worthy of their recognition, whether or not they ought to be recognized and treated as free, and so on. The lives of the oppressed group remain entirely dependent on the determinations made by those in the controlling group, which reinforces the unjust and problematic power differential that allowed for that oppression in the first place. Second, even if we were able to justify (following Sekyi-Otu) that having recognition bestowed on the oppressed still represents genuine recognition, there are reasons to believe that the dominant group would never freely do so. Those in power might have a range of social, political, and economic reasons to maintain the status quo where their position allows them to benefit from it. If so, those in power might willfully choose to remain ignorant to the needs of the oppressed group. Nancy Tuana and Shannon Sullivan (2006) have articulated this motivated, active ignorance and the process of maintaining that ignorance within what they call the epistemologies of ignorance (p. 1). They describe these acts of *not knowing*, as more than a simple lack of knowledge or understanding, but rather as a complex, intentional process that is directly tied to oppression and exclusion. Dermot Feenan (2007) suggests that this type of ignorance is actively constituted and reproduced as an aspect of power (p. 510). Considering these theories of motivated, actively constituted ignorance of oppression by those in power, it is doubtful that recognition is likely to arise naturally and in the mutual, reciprocal sense that Sekyi-Otu suggests. Forcing those in power to acknowledge realities that they have chosen to remain ignorant to is likely going to take the methods of resistance and actively struggling for recognition that Fanon advocates for in his interpretation of the dialectic. Without some pressure from the oppressed group, the dominant group is likely to remain comfortably and blissfully ignorant, while continuing to enjoy the benefits of occupying the dominant position. For these reasons, I defend an approach to recognition that appreciates the necessity of resistance, violent struggle, and the risking of life.

Despite my support of Fanon’s analysis of the dialectic, as well as current resistance efforts that are seeking independence and recognition in contemporary contexts, it is important to briefly acknowledge the risks associated with even the most necessary forms of active resistance.

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<sup>16</sup> Alexander (2010, see footnote 12) attributes this to the War on Drugs, calling the War on Drugs the engine of mass incarceration of black individuals for non-violent crimes.

In light of the explication of epistemologies of ignorance, there is reason to believe that powerful institutions have a stake in maintaining the power hierarchy, and as such, often respond negatively to the resistance efforts of marginalized groups. One potential risk for those who are engaging in resistance and struggle for recognition is the response of the criminal justice system. For instance, interactions between the Black Lives Matter Movement and law enforcement officers have not been particularly favorable, and this puts those activists at an increased risk of punitive measures from the criminal justice system. Additionally, when protests and resistance efforts do become violent, even when this violence can be reasonably justified, the risk of imprisonment or death at the hands of the criminal justice system increases.

Immediate entry into the criminal justice system is not the only source of risk for those who resist their oppression, however. For example, when students from oppressed groups are resistant to unfair educational policies or unequal treatment in schools, they often face punishment for resistant or defiant behavior. This punishment often takes the form of removing students from the classroom, which decreases their opportunities for in class instruction, often causes them to fall behind academically, and may even have the consequence of starting their push down the school to prison pipeline (Tyler, 2011, pp. 291-295)<sup>17</sup>

Another potential risk faced by those who display resistant or defiant behavior has been outlined by Nancy Potter (2012) in her proposal of a virtue theoretical account of defiance. Potter argues that the “readiness to be defiant” is a virtue that may be a necessary character trait for oppressed persons to cultivate in order to live with self-respect under the rule of authority and to potentially challenge that authority and enact social change (Potter, 2012, p. 24). However, despite her call for defiance among subjugated persons, she also warns us of potential repercussions of defiant behavior among oppressed persons, which can go as far as diagnosing healthy individuals who are exhibiting justified (given their circumstances) defiant behavior with a mental disorder (Potter, 2012, p. 24). While she does not want to deny the existence of genuinely pathological behavior that necessitates psychiatric intervention, Potter’s concern is that from the dominant position of the oppressors, normal, healthy, and even virtuous responses to one’s oppression might appear deviant or pathological. Potter writes: “As with other virtues, defiance has extremes and a mean. But identifying the extremes is difficult because actions that are appropriate from the perspective of the subjugated frequently are cast as an extreme (an excess) by those in authority” (Potter, 2012, p. 32). She develops her argument by way of an extended example of young black boys in the American school system, for whom *bad* behavior is often conflated with *mad* (or pathological) behavior. This can even lead some “defiant” children to be given a mental disorder label, namely that of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD). Potter writes:

Some children who are deemed “defiant” are eventually diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), with behavior characterized as “persistent stubbornness, resistance to directions, and unwillingness to compromise, give in,

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<sup>17</sup> See also Fowler (2011). Fowler describes how “zero tolerance policies” and the expansion of school-based policing have transformed school misbehavior into criminal offenses (Fowler, 2011, p. 15). Fowler also notes that “schools’ discretionary decisions to suspend, expel, and/or criminalize student misbehavior contribute to student push out, dropout, and ultimately to what researchers call the “school-to-prison pipeline” (Fowler, 2011, p. 16). These disciplinary actions that function to push students out of school and toward jails or prisons have drastic consequences, and disproportionately so for students of color (Fowler, 2011, p. 17). For further discussion of how school disciplinary policies disproportionately impact impoverished children and children of color, leading to further adverse educational, health, and career outcomes, see chapter 9, “Education” in Tyler (2011).

or negotiate with adults or peers” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 100). In other words, defiance sometimes is managed socially by medicalizing it. (Potter, 2012, p. 33)

As Potter’s (2012) account shows, the institution of psychiatry, reflecting the interests of the dominant, oppressor class, might utilize the tools of psychiatry in attempt to subdue resistance efforts through the attachment of stigmatizing diagnoses to those who challenge the mainstream or the dominant social order. While Potter’s analysis suggests that this is currently taking place through the diagnosis of “defiant” young black boys in school settings, there is also reason to believe that psychiatric diagnoses have been used in similar ways in past efforts to restrict resistance efforts of oppressed persons. In his incredibly insightful book, *The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease* (2009), Jonathan Metzl critically analyzes how Schizophrenia became a diagnosis primarily given to black men during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Metzl’s historical account and Potter’s analysis of current practices provide a compelling case of how psychiatry as an institution can be used to suppress the struggles for recognition of oppressed persons. Risk of hospitalization, being medicated, or social stigma can result from psychiatry’s pathologizing of resistance efforts among oppressed persons. When these risks are paired with the previously mentioned risks of incarceration, violence, or even death at the hands of the criminal justice system, it becomes evident that the violent struggle for recognition, even where necessary and justified, is not without risks. This is a *dialectic*, after all, and *both* sides are in struggle. The oppressor class has its own ways of resisting the struggles of the oppressed (criminalizing and pathologizing resistance efforts), and they employ those tools in an effort to maintain their position as dominant “masters.”

## V. By Way of Conclusion

When reading Hegel’s classic master-slave dialectic, it is important to reflect on *why* Hegel chose to include the ideas of “violence” and the “struggle to the death.” While Sekyi-Otu claims that some other Hegelian notions are absent or underscored in Fanon’s interpretation of the dialectic, I argue that Fanon’s account is entirely justifiable reading of Hegel, and also provides a more accurate picture of historical and contemporary resistance efforts. As evidenced by the historical and contemporary contexts examined, without active struggle there will never be genuine recognition of the oppressed group. Without a willingness to risk life in the struggle, the oppressed and/or the enslaved can never truly understand the cost of freedom, or show that they value independence and truth of self even more than they value life itself. Further, when the master(s) begin to see that freedom is *so* valuable to the slaves, that they are willing to stake their own lives for it, the master can start to cultivate an appreciation of the slaves’ desire for independence and begin to move towards genuine recognition.

When slaves are simply set free by their masters without being able to risk their own lives demanding their freedom, the slaves are prevented from the attainment of individual, independent self-consciousnesses. If this is the case, then actual historical slaves do not gain the independence that Hegel’s theoretical slave can obtain by seeing themselves in the objects of their creation. The historical slaves never gain the status of master, because when “there are no longer slaves, there are no longer masters” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, p. 219). Even if the slaves are freed from slavery, if they themselves did not play the essential role in obtaining this freedom, and it

was instead granted out of the values and dominance of the master, then the master is still in control of the possibilities available to the slaves. Thus, their futures are still dictated by the freedom proclamation of their white master. And, given the aforementioned work in the area of epistemologies of ignorance (Tuana & Sullivan, 2006), there is reason to believe that the masters would never willingly give up their power and bestow freedom on those individuals who they benefit from keeping under their control.

For these reasons, I maintain that Fanon's account is able to withstand Sekyi-Otu's criticisms and represents the strongest reading of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, as well as the most accurate representation of the dialectic as it manifests itself in real world applications. Fanon's emphasis on the role of the violent struggle to the death for recognition can shed light on contemporary resistance efforts by various subjugated groups in their struggles for recognition by society. This resistance, which at times necessitates violence and the risking of lives, is arguably necessary for oppressed persons to obtain their recognition on their own terms. Having a societal recognition imposed upon them by the dominant members of society merely reinforces and reproduces unjust hierarchies of power and systems of domination and oppression. Only resistance efforts that involve the demanding of recognition on behalf of oppressed persons can upset these systems and begin to move us towards a society in which mutual recognition could possibly be achieved.

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*Discussion Questions*

1. Do you think Fanon's account adequately stands up to the criticisms leveled by Sekyi-Otu, as Stewart argues it has? Can you think of other objections to Fanon's insistence on the violent struggle to the death for recognition?
2. Can you think of other social movements or historical events that support Fanon's account in addition to those illustrated by Stewart? Can you think of any examples that support a different reading of Hegel?
3. Do you think that there are ever justifications for violence (i.e., self-defense, war, or in social justice movements)? Do you think violence is ever necessary? Consider social and historical examples to defend your position.

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## BOOK REVIEW

*Unspoken Politics – Implicit Attitudes and Political Thinking.*  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

By Efrén O. Pérez

**Emily D. Bello-Pardo**  
*American University, Washington, D.C.*

Much has been written about attitudes in the past 50 years of political science literature, yet an overwhelming majority of the studies in this field have focused on studying explicit political attitudes (i.e., those expressly stated by respondents in opinion surveys). Efrén Pérez' latest book focuses on establishing a new line of inquiry to study the policy implications of implicit attitudes. Using an experimental and quantitative methodology, Pérez shows that there is a link between an individual's implicit attitudes about Latino immigrants and his or her attitudes about immigration policy in the United States.

As operationalized by Pérez, following the work of Lodge and Taber and other social psychologists, the difference between explicit and implicit attitudes is a result of the distinct types of cognition that give rise to each. Explicit cognition is part of high-order mental processes, while implicit cognition is part of low-order associational processes (Pérez, 2016, pp. 26-27). Thus, explicit cognition is part of the conscious thinking apparatus, requiring self-awareness, conscious effort, and energy. Implicit thinking occurs at a distinct, more automated level, as Pérez (2016) explains:

Implicit reasoning is a non-verbalized form of thinking that enables individuals to form broad, but stable representations of what is typical in one's environment. This emphasis on typicality means implicit reasoning encode and processes regularities that chronically emerge in one's surroundings (...) In this way, implicit thinking facilitates one's explicit thinking by quickly providing working knowledge about previous decisions, judgments, or evaluations that resemble the current context demanding one's more effortful thoughts. (p. 27)

It is due to these distinct types of cognition that individuals are able to censor or tailor their responses to public opinion surveys, particularly when asked about sensitive topics. Indeed, "explicit attitudes emerge further down a person's cognitive stream, after implicit attitudes are activated. They are easier to control, within introspection, and more easily influenced by social desirability or self-presentational concerns" (Pérez, 2016, p. 79). Due to this difference and the understudied nature of implicit cognition in the political sciences, Pérez focuses on studying the

subconscious interplay between implicit attitudes and explicit political thinking (Pérez, 2016, p. 170).

To corroborate the theory, Pérez finds evidence of implicit attitudes across news media content, a national opinion survey, and two lab experiments (Pérez, 2016, p. 170). Based on a quantitative analysis of American news media, he first concludes that “twin mechanisms” of priming and framing allow the media to create an environment that is conducive to forming widespread negative implicit attitudes toward Latino immigrants. In chapter 4, Pérez sets out to find quantitative evidence that “the news media prime some political objects over others, thus encouraging the public to associate specific political objects (e.g. groups, candidates) with certain issue domains (e.g., Valentino et al. 2013.)” (Pérez, 2016, p. 55) This systematic priming and framing of specific political objects through the news media provides the material upon which implicit attitudes are formed (Pérez, 2016, p. 55).

Pérez then measures implicit attitudes about Latinos using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), and concludes that differences in people’s IAT scores explain their preferences for specific migration policies. Pérez employs three different studies—a laboratory study conducted in July 2007 with college students (n=44), a nationally-representative survey conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix in July 2008 (n=350), and a second laboratory study conducted with college students (n=122). Lab Study I establishes the validity of the IAT, the national survey has richer demographics and more generalizability to US adults, and Lab Study II focuses on assessing whether the attitude elicited by the IAT is trained on Latinos in general instead of Latino immigrants in particular.

Pérez explains that “(...) individuals with more negative implicit attitude toward Latinos are more supportive of exclusionary illegal and legal migration policies” (Pérez, 2016, p. 171). Furthermore, the direction and intensity of individuals’ implicit attitudes influence them to judge political issues in specific ways, thereby allowing “(...) their implicit attitudes [to] shape the more deliberative aspects of their political decisions” (Pérez, 2016, p. 171).

The real methodological strength of the book is Pérez’s use of survey experiments to show that levels of education and variations in immigrant cues mediate the transformation of an implicit attitude into an explicit political judgment (Pérez, 2016, p. 171). Indeed, he found evidence to indicate that the influence of implicit attitude is stronger among more educated Americans and concludes that “Implicit attitudes are not confined to the margins of the polity. Instead, their influence reverberates most strongly among those citizens who are most likely to determine the course of politics” (Pérez, 2016, p. 145).

Given the strong empirical methodology, careful operationalization, superb quantitative analysis, and systematic demonstration of its arguments, Pérez’ book reveals important questions that remain open for further research. One such question is whether the news media is the only source through which implicit attitudes are learned. While the media is indeed pervasive and its attitudinal influence has been well-documented, individual attitudes can be influenced by numerous other sources beyond the media—socialization, education, etc. Pérez’ study demonstrates that the media influences implicit attitudes and in doing so raises the question of whether or not repeated exposure to counter attitudinal media information could challenge and alter implicit attitudes. Finally, the study invokes the question of whether this theoretical framework can be generalized to all implicit attitudes and its influences over all political objects. Namely, while the theoretical framework could work flawlessly for the specific issue of Latinos and immigration, I am left wondering about whether it applies to other topics and, particularly, intersectional identities.

## JOURNAL OF STUDENT RESEARCH

Regardless of the questions it brings up, Pérez' book successfully accomplishes its aim to explore the theoretical distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes, and clearly demonstrates its relevance for political decision making in the American public (Pérez, 2016, p. 3). In doing so, this book bridges the knowledge gap between the psychology and political science literatures and contributes to our depth of understanding the mechanisms that turn descriptive attitudes about a group into prescriptive policy positions. Individuals interested in cutting-edge political science, public opinion, political psychology, and immigration would be well-advised to pick up this book and give it a thorough read.

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### *About the Author*

Emily D. Bello-Pardo is a doctoral student studying American Politics, specifically focusing on public opinion, political behavior, and political communication. She graduated with a Master of Arts in Latin American and Caribbean Studies from Florida International University (FIU), where she was a Fellow of the Latin American Marijuana Research Initiative (LAMRI,) focusing on studying the impact of the legalization of marijuana in Uruguay on political attitudes in the country. Previously, Bello-Pardo received dual BAs in Political Science and International Relations from FIU, where she was inducted *Phi Beta Kappa*, graduated with academic honors, was part of the debate team, and attained certificates in Latin American Studies and National Security Studies.

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